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“But the water problems of our world need not be only a cause of tension; they can 
also be a catalyst for cooperation…If we work together, a secure and sustainable 
water future can be ours.” Kofi Annan (World Day for Water, 22 March 2002).1 
 
 
Source: www.waterwar.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
1 See: www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sgsm8139.doc.htm. 
6 
 
7 
 
Table of Contents 
1 Research question ........................................................................................................ 9 
1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 9 
1.2 Definitions............................................................................................................ 11 
1.3 The importance of water ...................................................................................... 15 
2.0 Theoretical framework ............................................................................................ 20 
2.1 Neoliberal institutionalism: The role of institutions ............................................ 21 
3.0 Earlier research ....................................................................................................... 24 
3.1 Earlier research on resource scarcity, conflict, and cooperation ......................... 24 
3.2 International river organizations .......................................................................... 27 
3.3 Hypotheses ........................................................................................................... 37 
4.0 Units, Data, and Methods........................................................................................ 39 
4.1 Data and units ...................................................................................................... 39 
4.1.1 Other river organization data ......................................................................... 40 
4.2 Methods................................................................................................................ 43 
4.2.1 OLS regression for continuous dependent variables ..................................... 43 
4.2.2 Challenges for time-series data ...................................................................... 44 
4.2.3 Logistic regression for dichotomous dependent variables ............................ 46 
4.2.4 The gravity model as a baseline..................................................................... 47 
4.3 Validity and reliability ......................................................................................... 48 
4.4 Dependent variables: cooperation and conflict .................................................... 50 
4.4.1 Cooperation, dyadic trade, and joint IGO memberships ............................... 50 
4.4.2 Conflict: The onset of a MID with at least one casualty ............................... 51 
4.5 Independent variables and control variables ........................................................ 52 
4.5.1 International river organization (IRO) in the dyad ........................................ 53 
4.5.2 Both countries in dyad members of the same IRO ........................................ 53 
4.5.3 Both states member of same bilateral IRO .................................................... 53 
4.5.4 Both states member of same multilateral IRO ............................................... 54 
4.5.5. Shared river basin ......................................................................................... 54 
4.6 Control variables ............................................................................................... 54 
8 
 
4.6.1 Peace history .................................................................................................. 55 
4.6.2 Regime type ................................................................................................... 56 
4.6.3 Dyad size........................................................................................................ 57 
4.6.4 Inter-capital distance ...................................................................................... 57 
4.6.5 Contiguity ...................................................................................................... 58 
4.6.6 Presence of one or more major powers within the dyad................................ 58 
4.6.7 Alliance .......................................................................................................... 59 
4.6.8 Level of development .................................................................................... 59 
4.6.9 Water scarcity ................................................................................................ 60 
4.6.10 Size of a shared basin .................................................................................. 61 
5.0 Analyses .................................................................................................................. 63 
5.1 Replication of Brochmann & Gleditsch .............................................................. 65 
5.2 The impact of IROs on conflict ........................................................................... 69 
5.2.1 The impact of IROs on conflict in dyads sharing a river basin ..................... 71 
5.2.2 IROs in the dyad and MID onset ................................................................... 75 
5.2.3 MID onset in dyads where both countries are members of the same IRO .... 76 
5.2.4 MID onset and membership in bilateral and multilateral IROs .................... 77 
5.3 IROs impact on MID onsets in dyads with water scarcity .................................. 78 
5.4 IROs impact on MID onsets in dyads between 1990–2000 ................................ 83 
5.5 IROs impact on MID onsets in specific regions .................................................. 85 
5.6 A short summary of the analyses ......................................................................... 86 
6.0 Objectives ............................................................................................................... 87 
7.0 Concluding remarks ................................................................................................ 89 
8.0. References .............................................................................................................. 93 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
1 Research question 
Do countries that share a river and also have an international river organization have 
more cooperation and less conflict, compared to countries without such organizations? 
1.1 Introduction 
In the post-Cold War world, scholars as well as the general public have increasingly 
focused on the scarcity and abundance of natural resources as potential causes of 
conflict. This thesis focuses on freshwater resources shared by two or more states.  
 
Some scholars have found that countries that share a river have a higher risk of fatal 
military disputes (Gleditsch et al., 2006). From water-abundant areas like Norway to 
the arid Middle East, water resources may generate conflicts of interest. Without 
strategies to anticipate and mediate between competing users of water, both within and 
across borders, water conflicts are likely to become more frequent. Water is a resource 
for which there is no obvious substitute, and cross-national water resources are 
regulated by poorly developed international law. Water users at all levels compete for 
this economic and life-essential resource. This calls for satisfactory management 
solutions. 
 
In this field, we can divide researchers into two broad approaches; the neomalthusian 
and the cornucopian (Gleditsch, 2003). Cornucopians hold the optimistic view that 
technology, distribution and well-functioning markets will prevent future scarcities 
from becoming critical. According to the cornucopian view, there is no inherent 
scarcity, only unequal distribution and inefficient use. In this perspective, states that 
share a scarce resource are more likely to cooperate than to end up in a violent dispute. 
Institutions can play an important role in meeting the challenge of scarcity. For 
instance, an international river organization may help different actors cooperate in 
regulating the use of a resource in the best common interest. The organisation may be 
able to prevent conflict and find sustainable and mutually agreeable solutions. If the 
cornucopians are right, there will be less conflict and more cooperation over shared 
10 
 
resources. In this study, I will investigate if international river organisations have a 
significant effect on conflict and cooperation, although for reasons to be explained 
later, the empirical analysis of cooperation remains very limited. 
 
The opposing, neomalthusian view is more pessimistic and predicts increasing conflict 
over scarce resources. In hard-core realism a scarce resource is very likely to cause 
conflict, from minor disputes to war. Not only is there unequal distribution, there are 
also global resource scarcities, which technological innovation cannot eliminate. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2001, 2008) firmly established 
climate change as a political issue on the global agenda. Climate change seems likely 
to generate major changes in our ecosystem, which can change water access for many 
people. With deteriorating access to natural resources, a neomalthusian view predicts 
increasing conflicts. Even if the most drastic future scenarios are unsubstantiated, a 
number of reports and policy statements underscore that climate change may become a 
security threat (Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007). In the neomalthusian view, an essential 
resource like water is likely to be a resource worth fighting for. 
 
The neomalthusian and cornucopian views serve as a background picture for this 
thesis. My theoretical framework is neoliberal institutionalism. I will try to find out if 
international river organizations have any effect on cooperation and conflict between 
countries that share a river basin. Neoliberal institutionalism emphasizes that 
institutions have an important role to play in international relations, regardless of 
whether one is a liberal or a realist, an optimist or a pessimist. Neoliberal 
institutionalism will be explored in greater detail later in Section 2.1. First, I outline 
some terms which I use frequently. 
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1.2 Definitions 
A dyad is defined as a pair of two countries. A dyad-year is a dyad for a particular 
year. 
 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) is defined as: “process which 
promotes the co-ordinated development and management of water, land and related 
resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an 
equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” 
(Global Water Partnership, 2000: 22). This holistic approach to water management has 
been promoted as a central answer to the question of how to manage shared water 
resources and avoid conflict (Dombrowsky, 2007: 7). This concept lays the foundation 
for the establishment of international river organizations. 
 
An international river is defined by the Convention on the law of the non-navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses
2
, as a river that flows through or forms a boundary 
between two or more countries. Thus, an international river can serve as a boundary 
between two states, as does the Rio Grande on the border between the USA and 
Mexico. A river can also cross the border, making one state upstream from the other. 
Some rivers run both across and along boundaries, as illustrated in Figure 1. A state 
can be upstream to one of its neighbors and downstream to another, and even upstream 
and downstream to the same state, in different river basins. A river can cross a border 
several times, then cross a border to a third state before again crossing back to the state 
where it originated. This complicates the relationship between states regarding 
management and ownership of the resource. Like dyads with rivers running across the 
boundary probably would be expected to give rise to resource scarcity-related conflict, 
while in dyads where the river forms the boundary conflict may arise because river 
boundaries are fluid and fuzzy. Scholars have found support in a multivariate analysis, 
that shared water basins predict an increased propensity for conflict, but support for 
                                              
2 http://untreaty.un.org/ 
12 
 
the fuzzy boundary scenario was not found. Neither did they find that the number of 
river crossings or the share of the basin upstream are significantly related to conflict 
(Gleditsch et al., 2006: 361).They did, however, find that basin size is significantly 
associated with conflict. I will investigate basin size together with international river 
organizations in my analyses later in Chapter 5, but I will not distinguish between how 
states share a river (Fig. 1). I have to leave that challenge to another researcher for 
capacity reasons. 
 
Fig.1. Typology of shared rivers 
 
Source: Toset et al. (2000: 980). 
 
An International river basin can be defined as “the area which contributes 
hydrologically (including both surface and groundwater) to a first order stream, which 
in turn, is defined by its outlet to the ocean or a terminal (closed) lake or inland sea” 
(Wolf 1999: 389) According to this definition a river is international when any 
tributary crosses the border between two or more states. This gives a total of 263 
International river basins, and 86 of them are shared by three or more states.
3
 
Approximately 40% of the world‟s population lives in international river basins, and 
the international river basins cover 45% of the earth‟s surface and account for 60% of 
                                              
3 This total of 263 international river basins is not regarded as 100% complete, but includes all important shared rivers 
(Dombrowsky, 2007). 
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the global freshwater flow, using this definition. 145 states share an international river 
(Dombrowsky, 2007: 4). These figures illustrate the importance of well-functioning 
water management, especially considering water as an increasingly scarce resource. 
Gleditsch et al., (2006), Toset et al., (2000), and Brochmann & Gleditsch, (2006), all 
focus on shared water and conflict. Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006) emphasize in 
addition that shared water resources can increase cooperation between dyads. 
 
An intergovernmental organization (IGO) is defined as a “formal, continuous 
institution established by treaty or other agreement between governments with a long-
range purpose. IGOs are multilateral; (…) there must be three or more members. They 
have secretariats to record their activities and monitor their affairs and they meet more 
or less regularly” (Russett & Oneal, 2001: 160).  
 
An International river (basin) organization:
4
 While an international river basin 
organization aims to cover the whole geographical area which contributes 
hydrologically to the river, an international river organization often only covers parts 
of a river. In the following I do not distinguish between them and will refer to them as 
international river organizations (IROs). The definition used here relates to formal, 
government-based institutions specifically designed for the management of 
international river basins. An organization does not need to be multilateral to be 
included, as long as it is formalized between governments. No less than 57 of the 86 
organizations included in this study are bilateral, in line with Dombrowsky (2007, 
Table A-1
5
). While the term „institution‟ is often used to refer to treaties and other 
legal agreements and „organization‟ to a body set up to monitor compliance with the 
agreements, I use the terms interchangeably here to refer to the organization. 
Dombrowsky (2007: 118) found that the 86 IROs that she identified vary greatly in 
geographical and substantive scope, form and function. For instance, some have large 
secretariats whereas others have limited staff and play a minor role. Most of the IROs 
                                              
4 I use IRO as an abbreviation for international river (basin) organization. Other scholars use RBO or IRBO, but they refer to 
the same organizations.  
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have monitoring functions but few have effective enforcement mechanisms. Some 
have the power to implement projects, while others do not. I will return to the 
implication of this later in Section 3.2 but I do not use these differences between the 
IROs in the statistical analysis. 
 
Cooperation: A wide definition is joint operation or action. Another, more feasible for 
this thesis, is “voluntarily arrangement in which two or more parties engage in a 
mutually beneficial exchange, instead of competing. Cooperation can happen where 
resources adequate for both parties exist, or are created by their interaction”6 Liberal 
peace theory emphasizes cooperation as one of the main pillars of peace together with 
democratic regimes and durable trade ties (Russett & Oneal, 2001). Trade and joint 
membership in international organizations are important forms of cooperation and I 
will use them as indicators in the statistical analyses.  
 
Conflict: While „conflict‟ may broadly be interpreted as „conflict of interest‟ or 
„conflict of values‟, I will use it here mostly as a short-hand term for armed conflict. 
To qualify as a war in the best-known statistical source of war data, an armed conflict 
needs to have a minimum of 1,000 battle deaths in a single year
7
. It is unreasonable to 
expect many conflicts over shared water resources to escalate to this level (Toset et al., 
2000). The UCDP/PRIO dataset on armed conflict has a lower threshold of 25 battle 
deaths per year (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Even that threshold is a bit high, and the data 
are backdated only to 1946. For these reasons, previous statistical studies of shared 
rivers and conflict have used the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset, also 
from the Correlates of War Project. MIDs include less regularly a range of low-level 
hostilities including threats to use force and displays of force, and they use the 
following definition:  
 
                                                                                                                                             
5 See also Dombrowsky (2007: 329ff.). 
6 (www.businessdictionary.com). 
7 See www.correlatesofwar.org for further information regarding this project and for the data. 
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Militarized interstate disputes are united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display 
or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the 
government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state. 
Disputes are composed of incidents that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual 
combat short of war (www.correlatesofwar.org). 
 
 I return to a discussion of the dependent variable, conflict, in Section 4.4.2. 
 
State vs. country vs. nation: Although in some studies, these terms have specific and 
different meanings, I do not distinguish between them here. Neither do the authors of 
previous work in this area and those who have generated the datasets.  
1.3 The importance of water  
We live in a world which changes rapidly. No one can predict the future with any 
confidence and climate change further increases our uncertainty. Increased human 
activity may cause stress and deterioration of our natural environment, resulting in 
climate change, land degradation, loss of biodiversity, deforestation, altered 
waterways, and declining water resources in some areas. The increasing demand for 
water is likely to become a great challenge, at the domestic as well as the international 
level.  
 
The management of water resources is gaining increasing attention. A large number of 
international conferences have focused on water management
8
. Developing the 
knowledge and skills to cooperatively manage international rivers is one of the great 
political and environmental challenges of the 21
st
 century (World Commission on 
Dams, 2000). So why is water particularly important? 
 
                                              
8 www.conferencealerts.org/water.htm has listed all conferences on water from October 2009 until November 2010. For 
instance, there is a conference in Batna Algerie on 10 November 2009, “First Conference on the Integrated Water Resources 
Management”, and another in Kyoto, Japan, on 27 October 2010, “International Conference on Sustainable Water Resources 
Management (ICSWRM). 
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First of all, freshwater is essential for all living organisms. It is also an indispensable 
resource needed for states to develop. Water is used as transportation, hydroelectricity, 
and commodity production. It also has symbolic and sacred value in many religions. 
The varied uses of freshwater obviously complicate its management. 
 
More than two thirds of the earth‟s surface is covered by water, but only about 3% is 
in the form of freshwater. Of all freshwater on earth, less than 15% is found in lakes 
and rivers (UNEP 1999: 4). A lot more is found in aquifers and glaciers, and on the 
poles. 
 
In water-abundant countries like Canada or Norway, the resource is often taken for 
granted. In many other countries, the situation is very different. Egypt has very little 
rainfall. To feed its population of more than 72 million people, it is completely 
dependent on water from the Nile. Being downstream from other states makes Egypt 
dependent and vulnerable. 
 
Controlling waterways and moving water to where it seems most needed are important 
and unavoidable elements of any country‟s development policy. For many states where 
water is a scarce resource, it has high priority on the political agenda, especially when 
the control of the resource lies in the hands of other states. Controlling water has been 
a cornerstone of all civilizations. London was established as an economic metropolis 
for centuries solely because of the river Thames and the highly fluctuating tides, which 
made it possible for ships to transport goods up the river at high tide (Tvedt, 2007: 8). 
 
Water resources have been used as a means to influence other states, cities, and 
civilizations at all times. Gleick (2008) categorizes different ways in which water is 
related to conflict.
9
 He divides water conflicts into six different categories, 
distinguishing between cases where water was a direct cause of conflict and cases 
where it served as a tool in an ongoing conflict: 
                                              
9 The categories are taken from Gleick‟s water and conflict chronology found at www.worldwater.org/chronology.html. 
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Control of Water Resources (state and non-state actors): where water supplies or access to 
water is at the root of tensions. 
Military Tool (state actors): where water resources, or water systems themselves, are used by a 
nation or state as a weapon during a military action. 
Political Tool (state and non-state actors): where water resources, or water systems 
themselves, are used by a nation, state, or non-state actor for a political goal. 
Terrorism (non-state actors): where water resources, or water systems, are either targets or 
tools of violence or coercion by non-state actors.  
Military Target (state actors): where water resource systems are targets of military actions by 
nations or states. 
Development Disputes (state and non-state actors): where water resources or water systems are 
a major source of contention and dispute in the context of economic and social development. 
 
It would have been interesting to investigate tools as well as causes of conflict using 
these categories. However, this would require substantial recoding of the MID data, 
which is not possible within the framework of this thesis.  
 
The earliest documented interstate conflict regarding water is a dispute between the 
Sumerian city-states of Lagash and Umma over the right to exploit boundary channels 
along the Tigris in 2,500 BCE (Wolf, 1998). Approximately 500 years ago 
Machiavelli and Leonardo da Vinci planned to divert water from the Arno River to 
weaken Pisa which had a conflict with Firenze. In 1957 India and Pakistan started 
negotiations after India had stopped water supply to Lahore (Tvedt, 2007: 10). Since 
independence in 1947, Pakistan and India have been engaged in a bitter conflict 
regarding Kashmir. Controlling Kashmir means controlling water, among other 
resources. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since independence in 1947, but 
none of them can be directly attributed to water issues. Rivers flowing to Pakistan 
from the Indian-administered part of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir have 
newly emerged as a bilateral flashpoint, since India started a controversial project on 
18 
 
the Chenab River that will reduce water flow into Pakistan. The rights to the water of 
Chenab were assigned to Pakistan by the Indus Water Treaty from 1960 
(www.isn.ethz.ch/).  
 
China is upstream in the Mekong river basin, but does not cooperate with the other 
states sharing the Mekong River. Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam are 
members of Mekong River Commission (MRC), while China and Myanmar are 
observers. China is building dams upstream which will influence the downstream 
states (Tvedt, 2007: 18). China‟s increasing demand for water have also made the 
Chinese government discuss leading water out of the Brahmaputra Basin, which is of 
great economic and mythical value for India and Bangladesh (Tvedt, 2007: 114). 
States that are highly dependent on upstream water resources that they do not control 
become very vulnerable. When there is an acute conflict of interest, there is a risk of 
armed conflict and the need to develop cooperation is all the more urgent. The world‟s 
geography is rather fixed, while human adaptation to it is not. The Tibet plateau is the 
source of many significant rivers, which have shaped the history of Asia, such as 
Yangtze, Brahmaputra, Yellow River, Indus, Salween, and Mekong. These rivers will 
be even more significant in the future with rising demands for water, and increased 
concerns regarding global warming and the melting of the Tibetan glaciers, which 
serve as a major water reserve in dry periods (Tvedt, 2007: 16). The Tibetan plateau 
holds the key to the destiny of enormous areas in Asia. If the glaciers melt, there may 
be increasing droughts as well as floods in the rainy season, and the rivers may alter 
course. This scenario threatens China‟s future economic growth and political stability 
(Tvedt, 2007: 18). Ganges, one of the major rivers in India, gets approximately 45% of 
its water from glaciers in Himalaya. Predictions state that water flow will decrease by 
about 67% between every July and September without the contribution from glaciers. 
This will affect 500 million people and 1/3 of land areas which are under artificial 
irrigation (Tvedt, 2007: 18). Given the importance of Tibet in this perspective, it is 
unlikely that China will ever grant Tibet independence. 
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Water is our most valuable resource, relevant at all levels; political, environmental, 
religious, economic, etc. Water is used at the micro level and for macro projects. 
Different uses such as irrigation, industry, transportation, and hydropower all require 
vast amounts of water. Economic growth frequently leads to a deterioration of 
freshwater resources (Gleditsch, 2003). Water is very unevenly distributed, so the 
challenge of deteriorating water quality and quantity differs significantly among 
regions. Climate change threatens to increase these challenges. Artificially altered 
waterways such as China‟s many artificial canals diverting water from the Yangtze 
River, may contribute to increasing tension, as well as solving problems. The 
increasing demand for water will lead to greater focus on water management.  
 
The number of IROs is increasing. The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable 
Developments was adopted by several countries in 1992. Its principle number two 
states that “Water development and management should be based on a participatory 
approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels” 
(www.gdrc.org/uem/water/dublin-statement.html). This has probably helped to 
stimulate the formation of new IROs. After 1992, more than thirty
10
 IROs have been 
formed, indicating that such international management will play a more important role 
between states in the future. The increase in IROs may also indicate a much higher 
demand for water and a higher awareness of water-related problems. Many states that 
were previously water-abundant now experience, or will soon experience, scarcity and 
deteriorating water quality. Some states also experience increased floods. Water will 
therefore remain a resource high on the political agenda as well as the research agenda. 
                                              
10 Source: Dombrowsky (2007: Table A-1). Some organizations may have been founded earlier than her table indicates, but 
have been reestablished with new members, e.g. because many countries gained independence by the end of the Cold War. 
The figures are therefore not completely precise. 
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2.0 Theoretical framework  
Theories in international relations (IR) generally take it for granted that all actors are 
rational. States are faced with many important challenges since they cooperate in an 
insecure world with no overarching authority with power to enforce laws and 
regulations. Liberalism and realism hold different views as to how states can cooperate 
and their willingness to do so. I will first outline some of the basic ideas of realism and 
liberalism before moving on to neoliberal institutionalism, which borrows from 
realism as well as from liberalism. I will try to show how the theory suggests why we 
should expect more peaceful interaction between states that have international 
institutions. The aim of this thesis is to show that river-specific institutions can have an 
independent effect on the behaviour of states. My analyses will show whether specific 
IROs have an independent impact on cooperation and conflicts between states. 
Conflict and cooperation often fit together like a hand in a glove. Cooperation often 
emerges out of disagreements. Conversely, cooperation can be a catalyst for future 
conflict. Cooperation does not mean there will no longer be any disagreements or 
conflict, rather that there exists a wish to solve disagreements peacefully. 
 
While realists are concerned with relative gains, liberals are more concerned with 
absolute gains. At the core of realism we have self-interested actors striving for greater 
relative power. State interaction is all about state survival, leaving little room for 
cooperation. Classical realism, as explored by e.g. Morgenthau (1948/1985), 
emphasizes that states‟ struggle for power drives all interaction between states. 
Cooperation will only emerge when states see the rationality in it for themselves and 
their position in the world hierarchy. Liberals sympathize more with idealism, 
emphasizing the important role of norms and values. Structural realism (neorealism) 
does not completely reject that liberal ideas are also important in international 
relations. Within the framework of these main ideas neoliberal institutionalism has 
evolved. 
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2.1 Neoliberal institutionalism: The role of institutions  
Interdependence between states will generate conflict. When one state‟s advantage 
becomes a disadvantage for another, there will be tension and disagreement. 
Neoliberal institutionalism holds that international institutions can help solve some of 
these disagreements. 
 
When the use of a shared water resource is inefficient, disputable or one anticipates 
future conflicts, there is a need to cooperate to manage the use. Both formal and 
informal rules may be applicable, and reaching an agreement meets many challenges. 
The need for cooperation and management regarding a resource does not mean that 
states will succeed in establishing joint management. A common understanding must 
be reached that cooperation will benefit all and that the risk of degrading the resource 
is greater with no cooperation. Even knowing this does not necessarily result in 
efficient cooperation. States often refrain from obligations thinking that keeping their 
options open may be more beneficial. The lack of commitment can often carry 
substantial hidden costs. There are many obstacles and actors, both domestic and 
international, which complicate the process of mutual understanding and joint action. 
Getting a good general view is almost impossible. The interdependence between states 
generates tension and conflict, and to avoid violence, states have to adjust their 
policies to one another. Keohane (2005) argues that this is more necessary now than 
ever because of the lack of a hegemonic power. Non-hegemonic cooperation is 
difficult since self-interested states, ordinarily motivated by what is best for them, 
would have to devote themselves to work for the world's common good. Despite the 
resistance to cooperation, states have complementary interests that will make 
cooperation beneficial. One important challenge here is to make states understand 
these potential benefits from cooperation. Institutional arrangements can play an 
important role in regulating and manage a resource. Institutions can serve as neutral 
arenas where states can cooperate and solve conflicts by providing reliable 
information, reducing uncertainty and minimizing transaction costs (Keohane, 2005: 
3). Institutions can facilitate issue linkages both among and within states to help them 
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find feasible solutions. Cooperation over time through institutions brings states into 
continuing interaction. In such environments incentives for cheating are reduced and 
the value of a states‟ good reputation increases. Institutions play a role to legitimize 
and delegitimize states‟ actions (Keohane, 2005). The optimal condition for 
cooperation through treaties or international organizations are when the expected 
benefits of the cooperation are high, the transaction cost relatively low, and the 
member states believe in the sustainability and compliance of the cooperation (Espey 
& Towfique, 2004). Institutions can be functionally specific, like institutions created 
for the purpose of solving water-related conflicts, such as the Nile Basin Initiative. 
Other institutions are more general in nature, such as Organization of African Unity 
(OAU). In a well-functioning institution, countries can refer disagreements for a 
peaceful settlement, decreasing the risk of violent conflict (Hensel et al., 2006). With 
regular contact between member states, norms for peaceful conflict resolution may 
develop (Russett & Oneal, 2001). This will help states to be adequate and predictable 
in interaction with other states regarding e.g. natural resources. 
 
Keohane (2005: 52) argues that cooperation in the international system is not 
harmonious, but an “intensely political process of mutual adjustment in a situation of 
actual and potential discord”. This is in line with Waltz (1959: 182), who states that, 
“in anarchy there is no automatic harmony”. The natural state of the world is conflict 
and competition. How can institutions evolve under such circumstances? Keohane 
(2005: 16) builds on both realism and liberalism, arguing that states don‟t cooperate 
out of altruism or plight for others, but because they seek security, power, and wealth 
for their own people. Keohane (2005: 6) further states that we need to go beyond 
realism not discard it”. States cooperate because it is functional for them. International 
regimes are founded and built to promote an environment where states can pursue their 
self-interest but at the same time be mutually beneficial to each other. Even on the 
restrictive premises that states are egoistic, self-interested, and rational, institutions are 
necessary in order for states to achieve their purpose. A state‟s conception of its 
interest and how to pursue its objectives depends on national interests and the 
distribution of world power, as well as the quantity, quality, and distribution of 
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information. Agreements that are hard to reach under conditions of high uncertainty 
may be feasible with the help of well-functioning institutions (Keohane, 2005). States 
can calculate their own outcomes from participating in an organization, and states are 
driven by self interest. The functional argument of cooperation between states builds 
upon this idea. Neoliberal institutionalism builds on both realism and liberalism. The 
insights realism gives to the understanding of world politics are fundamental and 
cannot be ignored. However, the concept needs to be reframed and also reflect the 
impact institutions have on states even when states‟ rational egoism persists (Keohane, 
2005: 245). Keohane emphasizes the important and central role institutions play in 
international politics, and by that he goes beyond the traditional realism where states 
are the only principal actor. Joint membership in an organization binds states together 
in a mutually complex interdependence (Keohane, 2005). Even if states are concerned 
with relative gains, states also pursue absolute gains because they see the rationality in 
it; that the cake gets bigger with cooperation and that it is mutually beneficial for all 
states to cooperate. This fits neatly with the liberal peace argument, which among 
other things, says that states that trade/cooperate with each other are more peaceful 
with each other, too. In classical realism cooperation would be difficult because of the 
importance of state security and relative gains. States prefer to refrain from trading or 
cooperating rather than lose their relative power advantage over others. 
 
IROs are growing in number, and it is likely that this trend will continue as more 
attention is given to water as an important resource possibly deteriorating in quantity 
and quality. Increasing numbers of IROs might be an indicator of more cooperation 
between member dyads. We might also find that these organizations are present 
between dyads that have less conflict. In the following I will further explore the need 
for integrated water management, and how different scholars link resource scarcity to 
both conflict and cooperation, before conducting my own analyses.  
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 3.0 Earlier research  
Earlier research has paid attention to three concerns regarding environmental security: 
to prevent war and armed conflict as a result of resource scarcity and environmental 
degradation, to prevent disasters other than war resulting from scarcity and 
degradation, and to prevent the erosion of the carrying capacity of the earth resulting 
in the loss of environmental sustainability in the future (Gleditsch, 2001: 177). 
 
Traditional IR theory has always been concerned with state security and the idea that 
resource scarcity can enhance prospect for conflict. A lot of conflicts are over territory, 
which is a resource in itself and also a way to control other resources, such as water. 
While water may seem like an abundant renewable resource, growing population and 
development creates an increasing demand for it, for uses like irrigation, hydropower, 
and sanitation. In addition to increasing demand, water is unevenly distributed 
globally. North America has an annual run-off of approximately 17,000 cubic meters 
per person per year (UNEP, 1999: 4). In comparison, Africa has 6,000 and Egypt just 
50 (Gleditsch et al., 2006: 363). Off all the world‟s usable freshwater, less than 1% is 
found in the Middle East or North Africa, and this region contains 5% of the world‟s 
population. Many countries with lower water availability today, particularly in Africa, 
also have population growth, so their water shortages may be exacerbated in the future 
(Toset et al., 2000: 974). Scholars have therefore predicted more conflict in areas with 
water scarcities like the Middle East and Northern Africa. According to UNEP (1999: 
6), two out of three persons will live with poor water conditions by 2025 if the world 
continues to develop at the same pace as today. Since water is a renewable resource, 
there is reason to believe that abundant amounts of water not will create conflicts to 
the same extent as non-renewable resources like gold, diamonds, oil etc. However, 
conflicts may arise where water is a scarce resource, and many actors demand the use 
of it or where the water is affluent but the distribution is skewed. 
3.1 Earlier research on resource scarcity, conflict, and cooperation  
Thomas Homer-Dixon (1994, 1999) and his associates have conducted the largest and 
best known body of work linking resource scarcity and environmental degradation to 
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conflict. They concluded that resource scarcity has an effect and contributes to violent 
conflicts in many parts of the developing world. These conclusions are based on a 
number of case studies. Homer-Dixon (1994) claims that conflict will increase even 
further in the future, since greater demand and increasing environmental degradation 
will lead to more severe resource scarcities. His main focus has been on non-
renewable resources, but among the renewable resources he argues that water has the 
greatest potential for stimulating international war, although only under special 
conditions (Homer-Dixon, 1994: 18). This is in line with the neomalthusian approach 
that generally expects conflicts to arise from increasing scarcities. However the 
empirical evidence comes largely from case studies of countries in conflict and it is 
difficult to draw general conclusions. Many other scholars also predict “water wars” or 
describe historic conflicts over water. So far, there are not many published large-n 
studies of water and interstate conflict. Toset, Gleditsch & Hegre (2000) showed that 
the probability of a militarized, interstate dispute in a dyad increases when a dyad 
shares a river. In a later related study (Gleditsch et al., 2006) found that states that 
share a river, particularly when the river is crossing rather than running along a border, 
have an increased risk of conflict, even when controlling for other relevant variables 
used in the study of interstate conflict. Klare (2001) argues that after the decline of 
ideological conflicts the struggle for essential life resources will grow, and water in 
particular. Klare (2001: 57) claims that by 2050 the increased demand for water may 
create intense competition for this essential resource in all but a few well-watered 
areas of the planet. Homer-Dixon (1994, 1999), Klare (2001) and Gleditsch et al. 
(2006), are far from the only scholars predicting conflicts regarding water. We also see 
a growing concern among politicians and in the media. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon warns that water shortages will drive future conflicts (www.un.org). To 
emphasize the water war scenario, the examples most widely used are conflicts 
between Israel and neighboring states. The Jordan River has been named as a 
contributing factor both in the 1967 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors and in 
the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 
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Other scholars argue that a pessimistic future water war scenario is unjustified and that 
states can cooperate to overcome resource scarcity. According to Wolf (1998), the 
problem with the example of Israel and its Arab neighbors is a complete lack of 
evidence that water was a significant casual factor. Wolf (1998), states that shots have 
been fired over water between Israel and Syria e.g. in 1951 and 1964–66. The latter 
conflict regarding water arose because Syria diverted water from the Banias Stream 
before the water entered Israel. This conflict was solved one year prior to the seven 
day war in 1967, and water was not a significant factor in that war (Wolf 1998). Wolf 
et al. (2003) identify 1,831 transboundary water-related events between 1950 and 
2000. Almost two thirds of them were classified as cooperative whereas only one third 
as conflictive. Of that third, only 37 events involved violence and 30 of them took 
place between Israel and its neighbors before 1970. This provides a good empirical 
foundation for the view that states are more inclined to cooperate than to conduct 
armed conflicts over shared water resources. This is in line with the cornucopian view 
and neoliberal institutionalism. But even though there is little evidence that water 
historically has created few conflicts, the problem remains that the demand for water 
increases in certain areas of the world. Wolf (2003) stresses that water scarcity is a 
major challenge. An uneven distribution of water is a potential cause of local and 
international strife, although cooperation remains more likely. It is precisely the 
concern for future water scarcity that will stimulate cooperation. He views full-scale 
water wars as very unlikely (Wolf, 1997; Gleditsch, 2003: 481). Wolf (1998) states 
that the history of shared international water resources is undramatic and that the only 
war fought over water was 4500 years ago
11
. Drawing on data from the International 
Crisis Behavior Project, he finds that in modern history only seven minor conflicts 
have been provoked by international water issues. Internal conflicts regarding watern 
are much more common, but internal instability may also infuse international water 
conflicts and political instability between some states in the future. Wolf (1998, 2003) 
                                              
11 The earliest documented interstate conflict known is a dispute between the Sumerian city-states of Lagash and Umma over 
the right to exploit boundary channels along the Tigris in 2,500 BCE (Wolf 1998). 
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does not completely reject the neomalthusian scenario but is generally more in line 
with the cornucopians. 
 
Cornucopian and liberal institutionalist scholars have generally focused on the 
cooperative aspect of environmental scarcity. They do not deny that conflicts occur, 
but cooperation is more likely (Brochmann, 2005). Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006) 
find some support for the idea that rivers stimulate cooperation as well as conflicts, but 
the effects are not strong. Kalpakian (2004) argues that the rational answer to a 
scarcity of water resources is cooperation. In his case studies he finds support for the 
claim that water disputes do not cause serious conflicts. This is in accordance with the 
findings of Wolf (2003). 
 
Most scholarly work in this area agrees that conflicts over water are possible, but 
differ in their assessment of the hazard of an outbreak of violence and their estimate of 
its likely intensity. A few scholars fear water wars, while others believe that peaceful 
negotiations between states are more likely. 
3.2 International river organizations 
More than 260 river systems are shared by two or more countries, and many of these 
countries also have a history of conflict (Gleditsch, 2003: 484). A number of countries 
in these river basins also cooperate through more specific river organizations. 
Agreements exist in more than 40% of all international river basins. In a quarter of all 
basins some form of international river basin organization exists (Dombrowsky, 2007: 
266). Establishing international river organizations is a relatively new phenomenon. 
The first one, Central Commission for the Navigation on the Rhine, was not founded 
until 1815. With increased water stress, the need for better management has become 
obvious and IROs have multiplied. 
 
Institutionalists emphasize the conflict-reducing effects of institutions. Thus, we 
expect the existence of a river organization to make a difference in the countries‟ 
histories of conflict. Formation of IROs or the conclusion of international bilateral 
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water treaties seem to be dependent on various characteristics of the rivers. For 
instance, Espey & Towfique (2004) found that the larger a basin as a percentage of a 
country‟s size the more likely the country is to conclude a treaty regarding the 
resource. The same study also shows that the more control one state has over the water 
basin, the less likely it is to conclude a treaty. Espey & Towfique (2004) also found a 
strong relationship between strong trade ties and effective enforcement of agreements. 
Other probable variables influencing states‟ willingness to enter into agreements are 
culture, language, history, distance between the states, regime type, etc.  
 
There are many obstacles to interstate cooperation over shared water resources. 
Cooperation is often constrained by imbalances in economic, political, and military 
power between the states that share the resource. International river management also 
involves social, political, economic, hydrological, and ecological dimensions (Espey & 
Towfique, 2004). The costs and benefits of cooperation will vary between the states. 
For some, the costs might be higher than the benefits: for instance one country might 
experience little water stress, and the shared water source might not be important for 
the state‟s overall supply, which naturally will be an incentive for not joining an IRO 
or other water treaty. The opposite might be the situation for another country that 
might be highly dependent on the shared water. In addition, imbalances in the power 
structures, economy, military and policy, will complicate cooperation and lead to 
disputes and conflicts. Just & Nethanyahu (1998) argue that „„asymmetric country 
characteristics‟‟ are major obstacles to cooperation, whether real or perceived. 
Obstacles that restrain cooperation originate from asymmetric information, scientific 
gaps, technological uncertainties, conflicting national interests, lack of effective 
enforcement mechanisms, lack of well-functioning institutions, natural claims for 
sovereignty, and geographical considerations such as an upstream/downstream 
relationship (Just & Netanyahu 1998: 9). Asymmetries between the states will 
normally raise the transaction costs and the net benefits from formal arrangements. It 
is likely that these asymmetries also will be obstacles to informal cooperation. This 
increases the need for formal arrangements (Espey & Towfique, 2004: 3). 
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In a realist view, a state will not engage in any form of cooperation which may alter 
the power balance negatively. Elhance (1999) contradicts this when he says that states 
refrain from exploiting the water resource unilaterally even if they have the power to 
do so, and are compelled to seek some form of cooperation with a weaker neighboring 
state. Statements like these provide some support for the liberal approach: cooperation 
might happen out of altruism, not only from a hard-core realist appreciation of national 
interest. 
 
According to international law, a state cannot use shared water resources in a way that 
might have negative impacts on other countries (Espey & Towfique 2004). Despite 
international law, not all states comply with the regulations. The interpretation of the 
law might be different in different states, or some states might not even feel bound by 
it. The Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes, from Helsinki 1992, has been ratified by 36 states, which means 
that it has not been accepted by the majority of states.
12
 Conflicts then can arise over 
the use of the shared resource. Upstream states may feel that they have territorial 
sovereignty and the right to use the water regardless of the need of downstream states 
(Espey & Towfique, 2004). The downstream state will try to use international law to 
prevent an upstream state from depreciating the quality and quantity of water in the 
basin. Increasing demand and deteriorating water resources give rise to conflict and 
demonstrate the need for cooperation. International law regarding shared water is in 
progress. In 1997 the states in the General Assembly of the United Nations ratified the 
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses. 
To enter into force, the convention requires ratification by 35 states, but as of 2008 
only 16 have ratified. Even if the convention is not ratified, the document is regarded 
as an important step towards arriving at an international law governing water. The 
convention addresses the principle of equitable and reasonable waterway usage and the 
“no harm” rule which covers a whole range of interstate relations to protect the 
environment (Epsey & Towfique 2004: 2). International law and an increasing 
                                              
12 See: www.unece.org/env/water/status/lega_wc.htm. 
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awareness of the growing challenge in water management can serve as an incentive 
and foundation for states to join different forms of cooperation to develop and improve 
the water management even further. States can cooperate through treaties, bilateral or 
multilateral agreements, or through IROs. All cooperation seeks to benefit the 
participants and different forms of cooperation will only be established if there is 
currently inefficient management, conflict over water use, or anticipated future 
conflict. Even these circumstances do not guarantee cooperation between states over 
water use, but seems to be important conditions. Another seems to be that the gains 
need to outweigh the costs for all parties (Epsey & Towfique 2004: 2). Treaty 
formation will be optimal when the expected benefits are relatively high, the 
transaction costs are relatively low, and the probability of compliance, or sustainability 
of the treaty, is high (Epsey & Towfique 2004: 3). 
 
In addition, the existing degree of both conflict and cooperation between states and the 
importance of the water resource to each country will influence the expected benefit 
from formal arrangements. If states control the resource, if it is not very significant for 
the overall water supply, or if neighboring states have not experienced conflict over 
water use, they will probably be less prone to seek joint water management. The 
benefits will not outweigh the costs. On the other hand, lack of control over the water 
resource, a history of conflict, and high dependency on water will increase the 
likelihood of cooperation through formal arrangements (Epsey & Towfique 2004: 3). 
 
One important means to improve management and cooperation between states that 
share an international river may be to establish, develop, and strengthen international 
river organizations with influence over the states‟ resource policies. At the 
International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin in 1992, four 
guiding principles of water management were established.
13
 The basis for this 
agreement was a rising international awareness of the increased demand and use of 
water. Poor water management could create negative consequences for our 
                                              
13 All principles in full can be read at www.cawater-info.net/bk/water_law/pdf/dublin_statement.pdf.  
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environment and development. One of the key challenges to water management is to 
overcome the lack of an overarching authority in an anarchic world, an authority that 
makes sure international law and agreements are enforced. The principles established 
at the Dublin conference emphasize the need for holistic and sustainable water 
management (ICWE, 1992). The conference emphasized that all management has to 
involve all levels and all interest groups to best protect the ecosystem and prevent 
deteriorating the water resources (principle one and two). The principles emphasize 
that water ought to be regarded as an economic good to which all humans have a right 
to gain access. The Dublin Conference had many participants from more than one 
hundred states and eighty organizations (ICWE, 1992).  
 
Water is essential for life and is also a multifunctional resource used and needed at all 
levels in life, agriculture, industry, recreation, habitat for threatened species etc. This 
multiple use complicates the possibilities for efficient and holistic management. 
 
Water use in transboundary rivers frequently generates both positive as well as 
negative externalities. These effects are often unidirectional and reciprocal effects are 
often excluded in the same use. In border rivers, shared lakes and shared aquifers the 
users affect each other. The mix of both positive and negative externalities complicates 
the water management (Dombrowsky, 2007). Non-consumptive use like navigation 
also calls for cooperation, but will probably not be as potent a force as consumptive 
use. Table 3.1 shows four different types of externalities. 
 
Source: Dombrowsky (2007: 268), Table 8.1. 
 
Table 3.1 A Typology of International Water Management Problems 
Type of 
externality 
 
Reciprocal 
 
Unidirectional 
 
Negative 
Water abstraction from a 
border river/shared lake or aquifer 
Wastewater discharge into a border 
river/shared lake or aquifer 
Upstream water abstraction 
Upstream water pollution 
 
Positive 
Wastewater treatment at a border  
river/shared lake 
Provision of retention area at a  
border river 
Upstream wastewater treatment 
Upstream provision of retention  
Area 
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It is reasonable to believe that cooperation is more likely in the case of reciprocal 
externality problems than in the case of unidirectional externality problems, and more 
likely in the case of positive unidirectional externality problems than of negative 
unidirectional externality problems (Dombrowsky, 2007: 274).
14
 
 
Numerous actors will claim the right and need to water, and often with legitimate and 
adequate grounds. It is easy to understand how complicated the management is with 
multiple domestic actors trying to cooperate in an international river basin, which 
often have many riparian states, e.g. the Nile which consist of ten basin states. Rules 
and regulations for water management are unavoidable to secure water quality and 
quantity, but at the same time extremely complicated. Neoliberal institutionalism 
believes in international organizations to play an important role in water management 
in international water basins. This theory was investigated in Section 2.1. 
 
Many rivers have organizations, committees, commissions, and so on to cooperate 
over different water use, both domestic and between states. This collaboration has 
often had a sectoral focus, losing sight of the larger picture. Since there are multiple 
actors and multiple uses of water, holistic water management is essential. Numerous 
conferences, both domestic and international, develop recommendations regarding 
water management and point to important global challenges. Guidelines and principles 
drawn up at international conferences can serve as important instruments for future 
cooperation and conflict prevention. The need for more integrated and holistic 
approaches has resulted in the development of the concept of Integrated Water 
Resources Management (IWRM).  
 
This holistic approach to water management has been promoted as a central answer to 
the question of how to prevent conflicts and how to manage shared water resources, 
and plays a predominant role in the prevailing multi-disciplinary policy discourse on 
                                              
14 Dombrowsky (2007, particularly Chapter 5) analyses this in detail. 
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water (Dombrowsky, 2007: 291). Incorporated in IWRM we find the concept of River 
Basin Management (RBM), which states that the water resource should be managed 
within the catchment area of the river basin, as we defined under Section 2.1. The aims 
of these over-arching concepts are to integrate all actors at all levels. The idea of a 
need for river basin management is not new. We find river organizations that were 
established almost two hundred years ago, e.g. the previously noted Central 
Commission for the Navigation on the Rhine
15
, founded in 1815. The organization had 
a narrow focus, cooperating only over the navigational use of the Rhine.  
 
In the last decades we have seen a renewed focus on water management and the 
development of a legal framework. For instance, river basin management is a legal 
requirement of the Water Framework Directive of the European Union (EU, 2000). 
The main ideas behind the integrated water management, through IWRM and RBM, 
can be summarized as follows: to manage water resources at the level of the river 
basin, not just at the level of the political jurisdiction of a state, to implement all water 
using sectors and actors, and to ensure that water resources can best be managed 
through the set-up of IROs (Dombrowsky, 2007: 10). These organizations‟ main goal 
is to secure a sustainable and just use of a common resource, to prevent conflict and 
enhance cooperation. 
 
A new era of water management started with the International Conference on Water 
and the environment in Dublin 1992. Major international organizations like the UN 
and the World Bank support the increasing need for a global policy dialogue on water 
issues (Dombrowsky, 2007: 10). New global actors such as the World Water Council 
(WWC) and the Global Water Partnership (GWP) have also emerged. The WWC was 
established in 1996 and is an international water policy think tank. The WWC is a non-
profit and non-governmental umbrella organization that facilitates political 
commitments to sustainable water management at all levels.
16
 The GWP was 
                                              
15 See Table A-1 in Appendix 1. 
16 See www.worldwatercouncil.org for additional information. 
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established in 1996 by the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), and the Swedish International Development agency (SIDA).Their aim is to 
support and work with all organizations involved in water management
17
. By 
analyzing statements from different international water conferences, there seems to be 
a lot of political will in the international community. However, international water 
management is expected to meet considerable challenges because of the many actors 
and multiple uses in international river basins. The increased awareness of water issues 
and a common goal of sustainable water management, gives hopes to the difficult 
challenge of international cooperation in international water basins. But, all the good 
intentions need to materialize.  
 
Despite the call for IROs that involve all basin states, more states tend to prefer 
bilateral agreements. The majority of river organizations established over the last few 
decades have also had a narrow and sectoral focus. Thus, a few countries might reach 
an agreement at the expense of other states in the water basin (Dombrowsky, 2007). 
When not all actors and sectors are being heard, agreements like this might lead to 
disagreements and conflicts. Who gets to enforce their will upon other actors when 
there is a conflict of interest? According to realism, the strongest state will generally 
win and have its requests granted. A strong state will not voluntarily give up their 
power and influence to an IRO and therefore it still seems to be rare to grant such 
organizations sufficient authority to influence the behavior of states (Dombrowsky, 
2007: 13). One IRO with executive power is the Organization for the Development of 
the Senegal River (OMSV). Senegal, Mauretania, and Mali are members, while 
Guinea is still an observer. The organization is dealing with multiple areas like 
ecology, economic development, hydropower, irrigation, navigation, river regulation, 
river quality, and river quantity. The organization has autonomy and the power to enter 
into contracts. All decisions are made unanimously and the decisions are binding for 
the member states. The countries seek to settle disputes through conciliation and 
mediation. If this does not succeed, the dispute is taken to the African Union (AU) and 
                                              
17 See www.gwpforum.org for additional information. 
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from there to the International Court of Justice as last appeal tribunal (Dombrowsky, 
2007: 13, 349).
18
 Unfortunately, organizations with authority like OMSV remain rare. 
Nevertheless, it is important to develop more such organizations that have a potential 
to play an important role in international water management (Dombrowsky, 2007). 
States need strong organizations that benefit all states riparian to an international water 
basin even if it is difficult to establish them. Building, not to say maintaining, 
institutions in an anarchic world can be frustrating and difficult when the building 
blocks do not fit together. However, not all institutions need an effective centralized 
authority like OMSV. Institutions can also be important and effective when the actors 
and issues are relatively few. Small and narrow organizations can serve as a first 
important building block and be developed further at a later time. The cooperative 
environment can positively influence other actors to develop in the same direction, 
completely in line with the theory of neoliberal institutionalism. Dombrowsky (2007: 
292) found in her study that the degree of integration of the majority of existing 
international water management institutions is relatively low. Her economic analysis 
does not support a general imperative to integrate (Dombrowsky, 2007: 292). 
 
The main objections to the development of IROs have been that they are much too 
costly, complicated, and extensive. The chances of success are small compared to the 
input of resources. The gap between prescription and reality is too wide. The whole 
concept of integrated international river management is described by some researchers 
as inadequate. Marty (2001), a political scientist, rejects the role that integrated river 
management can play in international waters. He supports a more sectoral or a case-
by-case approach. He sees no need for an overarching framework like an IRO, since 
many riparian problems by themselves are so complex that it seems unwise to increase 
their complexity even further (Marty, 2001: 399). This view is supported by other 
scholars, e.g. Waterbury (1997), who warns that the cost of integrated water 
management in international rivers will be excessive and that the whole concept of 
integrated water management is elusive. Other scholars take a more balanced view and 
                                              
18 See Table A-2 in Dombrowsky (2007: 349) for further analyses of OMSV. 
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argue that the structures of integrated water management can be difficult to establish, 
but that they can play an important role in international rivers. 
 
Many experts tend to regard integrated-issue river management as the more promising 
approach, but whether it really performs better than single-issue management depends on a 
variety of conditions. Integrated management … may also provide more opportunities for 
issue-linkages, which may improve the possibilities for cooperation (Bernauer, 1997: 184). It 
seems that although international river management institutions, designed to manage 
transboundary rivers in an integrated manner are probably more difficult to establish and 
operate, they may contribute to better performance or river management (Bernauer, 1997: 
192f). 
 
Even if the challenges in establishing IROs seem overwhelming, and the effects of 
their presence might be limited, they raise the awareness of the important role of 
water, and the need to balance the multiple needs and uses of it. An IRO cannot be 
judged merely on how well it serves one state at a given time, but on an assessment of 
what the institution can contribute in the future, which of course cannot be precisely 
defined (Keohane, 2005). The theoretical concept of integrated water resource 
management undoubtedly has important aspects, but does not specify under which 
circumstances the concept can be implemented (Dombrowsky, 2007: 15). All the 
unresolved issues regarding this call for more research in this area. My own research 
will focus on the effects IROs might have on conflict and cooperation in a dyad. 
Despite the IROs‟ difference when it comes to institutional design, main goals, 
effectiveness etc., I found no time exploring this to develop a way to categorize them 
e.g. into different issue areas. This is an obvious weakness of the present research 
design, but points to possible future extensions. In my analyses I will mostly lump all 
the IROs together, although I will also analyze bilateral and multilateral IROs 
separately. 
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3.3 Hypotheses 
To answer my research question, “Do countries that share a river and also have an 
international river organization have more cooperation and less conflict, compared to 
countries without such organizations?” I have formulated the following hypotheses, 
that all presuppose that everything else is equal. 
 
The first two hypotheses seek to investigate differences where at least one state in a 
dyad is member of an international river organization vs. dyads where no states are 
members: 
 
H1: A dyad where at least one state is member of an international river organization 
has less conflict than dyads where no states are members.  
 
H2: A dyad where at least one state is member of an international river organization 
cooperates more than dyads where no states are members. 
 
The next hypotheses seek to investigate the effect of shared membership in an 
international river organization on conflict and cooperation: 
 
H3: A dyad where both states are members of the same international river organization 
has less conflict than other dyads 
 
H4: Two states that are members of the same international river organization cooperate 
more than other dyads. 
  
The following hypotheses investigate differences between bilateral and multilateral 
international river organizations on conflict and cooperation.  
 
H5: Dyads where both states are member of the same bilateral international river 
organization have less conflict than other dyads 
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H6: Dyads where both states are member of the same bilateral international river 
organization cooperate more than other dyads  
 
H7: Dyads where both states are member of the same multilateral international river 
organization have less conflict than other dyads 
 
H8: Dyads where both states are member of the same multilateral international river 
organization cooperate more than other dyads  
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4.0 Units, Data, and Methods 
4.1 Data and units 
The hypotheses will be tested using statistical analysis. The dyad year
19
 will be the 
unit of analysis throughout my thesis. Transboundary cooperation and conflict 
necessarily imply the participation of more than one state; therefore it is appropriate to 
conduct the analysis at the dyadic level. Only dyads on the same “continents”20 are 
included because states separated by ocean cannot (by definition) share a river basin. 
In this sense, island states, which do not share land territory with other countries, form 
separate continents and will also be excluded. This reduces the number of dyad-years 
substantially, from 528,640 to 83,406 in the period between 1950 and 2000.
21
 Another 
condition for most analyses in this thesis is that the dyads used in the analyses share a 
river basin. There is no reason to suspect IROs to make a difference in a dyad‟s level 
of conflict or cooperation if they do not share a river basin. This will further reduce the 
number of units for the analyses. Due to data limitations for some of the variables the 
time span chosen for my analyses is mainly 1950–2000. Many of my explanatory 
variables are coded from 1814 onwards, so the time span for similar analyses can be 
extended as the data improve. Since the drought data are only accessible from 1975, 
the analyses will go from 1975 when this variable is being used. 
 
I will mostly use data from the dataset collected and used by Gleditsch et al. (2006). 
Their dataset on shared rivers builds on a dataset created by Hans Petter Wollebæk 
Toset and analyzed in Toset et al. (2000). Later it was supplemented with additional 
data from Aaron Wolf‟s Transboundary Freshwater Spatial Database. The supplements 
                                              
19 A dyad is a pair of two countries. A dyad-year is a dyad for a particular year. 
20 Apart from single-island states, I use the same eight continents as Gleditsch et al. (2006: 9): North America (which 
includes all countries from Panama and northwards), South America (all countries from Colombia and southwards), 
Hispaniola (Haiti and the Dominican Republic), Africa (Egypt is only included here), Great Britain and Ireland, Western 
Eurasia (which includes all countries west of Russia and Turkey), Eastern Eurasia (includes all countries east of Russia and 
Turkey), and Borneo & New Guinea. Russia and Turkey are included in both eastern and western Eurasia. 
21 The number 83,406 is for a dataset where all dyad-years with missing data have been excluded.  
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aimed at creating a more complete dataset that included all principal river basins, to 
include non-contiguous basin-sharing dyads, to include data on the magnitude of the 
water resource, and to clarify the ratio between upstream/downstream and boundary-
demarcating rivers in the dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2006: 366). An example of an 
important dyad that shares the same river basin without being contiguous is Egypt and 
Ethiopia. PRIO‟s Shared River Basin Database contains information on all pairs of 
countries (contiguous and non-contiguous) sharing rivers (either upstream/downstream 
or border-demarcating) between 1816 and 2002. The dataset also contains information 
about the size of the river basin (measured as the area), the number of river crossings, 
the share of the basin in the upstream state, contiguity between the countries in the 
dyad, the length of river boundaries, etc. (www.prio.no/cscw/envi/rivers). Several of 
these variables will be used in the following analyses. The dependent variable comes 
from the Militarized Interstate Disputes data of the Correlates of War Project 
(COW)
22
. The control variables come from different sources and are described in 
Section 4.5. On the basis of Dombrowsky‟s (2007: Table A-1, p. 330) I have created 
four variables
23
 and added them to the 2006 dataset. Information coded is: the 
foundation year of the first international river organization in a dyad, the foundation 
year of the IRO when both states in a dyad are members of the same international river 
organization, and whether the states in a dyad are members of the same bilateral or 
multilateral IRO. The variables make it possible to investigate the relationship between 
membership in IROs and their effect on conflict and cooperation. As far as I know this 
has not been tested earlier. 
4.1.1 Other river organization data  
As part of Marloes Bakker's PhD research at the Institute for Water and Watershed at 
Oregon State University, a new dataset
24
 is in progress. Like Dombrowsky (2007), the 
new dataset lists all known international river organizations (IROs). The new source 
                                              
22 More information about COW is found at www.correlatesofwar.org. 
23 All the variables and their sources are thoroughly described in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. A more thorough description about the 
data coded can be found in the codebook in Appendix 1. 
24 See http://transboundarywater.geo.orst.edu/research/RBO/ for all information regarding Bakker‟s dataset. 
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builds on Dombrowsky‟s work, with many additional contributions25. In Bakker‟s 
database, IROs are defined as “formal, government-based institutions specifically 
designed for the management of international river basins” 
(http://transboundarywater.geo.orst.edu/research/RBO/ ). Dombrowsky (2007) does 
not have a similarly precise definition. But a comparison with Bakker‟s dataset leaves 
the impression that their coding criteria are very similar. However, Dombrowsky 
(2007) is probably somewhat more restrictive, which explains why she has a 
somewhat lower number of IROs. Bakker‟s data have more river basins (mostly sub-
basins) than Dombrowsky (2007) and she also lists more IROs. I considered using 
Bakker‟s data, but since it is described as a dataset in progress I decided to use 
Dombrowsky‟s published data. However, I did compare the two datasets in order to 
assess how much information I would lose using Dombrowsky (2007) rather than 
Bakker. I found that using or supplementing Bakker‟s data probably would not alter 
my results much. Many of Bakker‟s IROs are in river basins which are also found in 
Dombrowsky‟s data. For instance, while Dombrowsky (2007: 331) lists only one joint 
IRO in seven international river basins between Canada and USA and one joint 
organization in five international river basins between Guatemala and Mexico, Bakker 
has coded 36 organizations in 15 international river basins between Canada and USA 
and eight IROs in five international river basins between Guatemala and Mexico. 
Table 4.1 illustrates this. We can see that Bakker‟s data contains both more IROs and 
International river basins.
26
 I have coded Dombrowsky‟s data in dyadic form. 
Therefore, I do not lose much information by not adding the missing IROs, as long as 
the same dyads have already been coded in another IRO, and the foundation dates
27
 do 
not differ significantly.  
                                              
25 All contributing partners to Bakker‟s data project are found at http://transboundarywater.geo.orst.edu/research/RBO/. 
26 The sources for this table are http://transboundarywater.geo.orst.edu/research/RBO/ and Table A-1 in Dombrowsky (2007: 
330ff). 
27 In the Candelaria river basin the foundation dates differ, If Bakker‟s date is correct, I have lost 27 observations for this 
dyad. 
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Table 4.1 Differences in Bakker’s and Dombrowsky’ data 
 
River 
basins 
Member 
dyads 
Bakker’s IRO Founded Dombrowsky’s 
IRO 
Founded 
Candelaria Guatemala 
Mexico 
International 
Boundary and 
Water Commission 
1990 International Borders 
and Water 
Commission 
1987 
 Guatemala 
Mexico 
 
The International 
Commission on 
Limits and Waters 
between Mexico and 
Guatemala (CILA) 
1961   
Coatan 
Achute 
Guatemala 
Mexico 
International 
Boundary and 
Water Commission 
1990 International Borders 
and Water 
Commission 
1987 
 Guatemala 
Mexico 
CILA 1961   
Alsek Canada 
USA 
Joint Transboundary 
Technical 
Committee(TBRTC) 
1999   
 Canada 
USA 
Int. Joint 
Commission (IJC) 
1909   
 Canada 
USA 
The Pacific Salmon 
Commission 
1985   
Columbia Canada 
USA 
Int. Joint 
Commission (IJC) 
1909 Int. Joint Commission 
(IJC) 
1909 
 Canada 
USA 
IJC Board: Int. 
Columbia River 
Board of Control 
1941   
Colorado Canada 
USA 
International Water 
and Boundary 
Commission (IBWC) 
1950   
 
Another difference is that Bakker divides certain international water basins into sub-
basins. For instance, La Plata is divided into six different sub-basins and the Nile is 
divided into three sub-basins. Bakker also list the same IROs in different international 
river basins where there is one IRO representing many international water basins, e.g. 
the International Boundary and Water Commission, between Guatemala and Mexico, 
which represents four different water basins
28
. Dombrowsky (2007) does not. I 
concluded that most differences in the two datasets are likely to play only a minor role 
with regard to the information I need to answer my research question. The additional 
effort required to merge the data would only add a few units to my coded variables, 
and the work would be too time consuming within the framework of this thesis. 
                                              
28 See http://transboundarywater.geo.orst.edu/research/RBO/RBO_S.Am.html. 
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4.2 Methods29 
Chapter 5 contains the empirical analyses. Both the dependent variables in the 
analyses of cooperation, Joint membership in IGOs, and Dyadic trade, are continuous 
variables. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression will therefore be my analytical 
tool in these analyses. In the analyses of conflict I use logistic regression analyses, 
since my dependent variable is dichotomous. In both cases I use the gravity model
30
 as 
a baseline, and add other relevant variables to the model. Specifying the model so it 
adequately fits the data is crucial for the ability to achieve high accuracy in the 
interpretations of the results. This is often called the model‟s goodness of fit. But most 
importantly theory and empirical facts always have to be the main determinant of 
which variables to implement in the analyses, statistical considerations less so. 
4.2.1 OLS regression for continuous dependent variables  
Multiple regression allows the researcher to ask general question like "what is the best 
predictor of conflict between two states in a dyad?" The major conceptual limitation of 
all regression techniques is that we can only ascertain relationships, but never be sure 
about underlying causal mechanisms (Gujarati, 2003).  
 
OLS regression needs to meet some requirements in order to reach reliable results. It 
assumes a linear relationship between the dependent and the  independent variables. A 
scatter plot between variables can show if the relationship is indeed linear. Another 
condition for OLS regression is that the residuals are distributed normally. To test for 
this I produced histograms for the residuals as well as to check normal probability 
plots, in order to inspect the distribution of the residual values. Correlations between 
independent variables also cause problems in regression analyses, and to test for this I 
made correlation matrixes between all my independent variables and ran tolerance 
tests
31
.  
                                              
29 All general information regarding method and analytic challenges are found in Gujarata (2003), Chatham (1989), Skog 
(2004), Brochmann (2005), and www.statsoft.com. 
30 See e.g. Zipf (1946), Isard (1956), and also a description in Section 4.2.4. 
31 This is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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4.2.2 Challenges for time-series data 
Time-series data are often better suited than cross-sectional data to explain causal 
relations, but these data are not unproblematic to analyze. It is expected that certain 
events cause an effect, as when I investigated whether IROs have any effect on 
conflict and cooperation. To be able to test for this there is a need for data where it is 
possible to test for change over time, with the aim of explaining the observed changes. 
For example, why was there conflict in a certain dyad before 1979 and peace now? Is 
it partly because of the IRO? Regression analyses can help answer questions like these, 
and perhaps provide a basis for concluding that the establishment of an IRO 
contributed to the creation of peace. But some caution is in order. Temporal and spatial 
properties of time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data can create serious problems in 
regression analyses. Residuals from a regression model are most likely not 
independent in time-series data, where observations represent intervals of time, usually 
equally spaced, e.g. every five years. The main problem of autocorrelation is that the 
standard error of the beta coefficients are underestimated, which can make variables 
look more significant than they are (Gujarati, 2003:455). Autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity are standard features of a lot of data in the social sciences. When 
observations are dependent, the same applies to the errors. For instance, we might 
experience a trend of increasing establishment of IROs together with a decrease in the 
onset of military disputes in the world. But this might be a spurious correlation rather 
than a causal relation between the events. This problem is highly relevant here since 
the increasing awareness of the importance of water parallels so many other rapid 
changes. If trends develop simultaneously there is a risk of concluding in favor of a 
causal relationship on the wrong grounds. Having a long time-series decreases the 
chance of spurious correlations between independent events but does not eliminate the 
problem. Stronger trends increase the risk of finding high correlations that are causally 
meaningless (Skog 2005:325). 
 
There are, however, ways to work around these different challenges to make OLS 
regression a suitable method for TSCS data. I use OLS regression in my analyses of 
the relationship between membership in IROs and cooperation. To control for time 
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dependence, I include lagged variables
32
 of the dependent variables as controls. It does 
not eliminate the problem; it is, however, the only statistical means available for me in 
this thesis.
33
 Lagged variable is one way to handle the autocorrelation problem when 
the dependent variable is continuous. The problem of systematic changes over time in 
the residuals can also be eliminated by identifying variables that may create the effect 
and including them as independent variables in the analyses. But it can be challenging 
to identify all the necessary control variables when dealing with complex research 
questions (Skog, 2004:337). The advantage of including a lagged variable is that we 
do not need often inaccessible data to explain the trend making causes in the residuals.  
 
Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006) used GLS regression in their TSCS analyses
34
. GLS 
regression stands for Generalized Least Squares and is a variant of OLS regression 
which takes into consideration the problem of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in 
time series data. The GLS model gives observations coming from units with greater 
variability less weight than observations with lower variability. Therefore the GLS 
regression model is capable of making estimates that are BLUE (best linear unbiased 
estimator). The observations that are clustered around the unit mean will be given 
more weight than widely scattered observations. If I had ignored the problems above 
and tried to test different hypotheses I would have created too large confidence 
intervals which decreases our probability to yield any significant results from our 
analyses. Another risk is that the estimates created from the OLS regression may be 
biased without the possibility of knowing if they are underestimated or overestimated. 
This may bias the conclusions drawn from the results. Analyses with GLS regression 
help to create a more accurate confidence interval and that increases the probability to 
gain significant results. The rule should therefore always be to use GLS regression in 
the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. It may not always be easy to 
use GLS regression, so there should be serious problems with heteroskedasticity and 
                                              
32 According to Håvard Hegre (personal communication, 12 October 2009), a lagged dependent variable takes away a major 
part of the problems of autocorrelation 
33 SPSS does not have a GLS regression for panel data to correct for the autocorrelation.  
34 See Section 5.1, Table 5.1, Models 2 and 3. 
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autocorrelation before OLS is abandoned. The problems with TSCS data also apply 
when using logistic regression analyses. 
4.2.3 Logistic regression for dichotomous dependent variables 
The dependent conflict variable, onset of a militarized interstate dispute (MID) with at 
least one fatality, is a dichotomous variable which makes logistic regression a useful 
method to explore the causal relationship between IROs and conflict. Maximum 
likelihood logit estimation evaluates whether the expected frequencies under the 
respective model are significantly different from the observed ones. Reviewing the 
residuals tells us whether the model is appropriate for the data. The residuals should be 
random noise. In logistic regression the residuals are different from ordinary OLS 
regression. The residuals are not normally distributed. This has to be taken into 
consideration when estimating the regression coefficients. One common method to use 
is the maximum likelihood method.  
 
In logistic regression a linear relation cannot be assumed. A non linear relationship is 
e.g. if the dependent variable Y increases more rapidly with low values of X, than high 
values of X, or vice versa. Another example is if Y decreases with low values of X, but 
increases with high values of X (curve-shape). Typically the logistic regression curve 
will have an s-shape. A linear regression model usually takes this form: 
 
Y = b0 + b1*x1 + b2*x2 + ... + bn*xn 
 
When the simple linear regression model does not adequately fit the data a nonlinear 
regression model can be used, or the data need to be transformed to fit a linear model. 
We observe 0 and 1 in the dependent variable MID onset
35
, but by performing the logit 
transformation on the left-hand side of the logit regression equation we obtain 
something similar to the standard linear regression model where the left hand side is 
the log odds of the latent probability of Y=1. To interpret the logit scale is not as 
simple as to interpret shares or percentages, but the transformation of the data gives a 
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linear regression curve. The name logit stems from the fact that a non linear model is 
made linear via the logit transformation. The logit regression model will always yield 
predicted values for the dependent variable between 0 and 1, regardless of the values 
of the independent variables. The model can be written as: 
 
Y = exp(b0 + b1*x1 + ... + bn*xn)/{1 + exp(b0 + b1*x1 + ... + bn*xn)} 
 
Or written as: 
 
ln(p/1-p)=b0+b1*x1+bn*xn… 
 
To interpret the results, the parameter estimates should be converted into odds by 
using the anti-log function. 
4.2.4 The gravity model as a baseline36 
In the model used in the replication of Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006), and in my 
analyses of the effects of IROs on cooperation and conflict, I use a gravity model as a 
baseline (Isard, 1956; Zipf, 1946). The gravity model is well established in geography 
and economics. The model was originally developed to assess travel flows between 
cities relative to distance (Zipf, 1946), and has since been adapted to other fields of 
research, such as dyadic trade flows. The basic gravity model explains bilateral trade 
between countries as proportional to the product of the size of the economies and 
inversely proportional to the distance between them. This is usually measured by GDP 
and distance between the capitals. This basic gravity model typically takes the 
following form: 
 
Tab = f (Yab, Dab, Rab) 
 
                                                                                                                                             
35 See Section 4.4.2. 
36 My sources for the description of the gravity model are Zipf (1946), Isard (1956), Brochmann (2005), Brochmann & 
Gleditsch (2006), Simmons (2005), Hegre (2008), and www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravity_model_of_trade.  
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where f is a constant, Tab represents the trade flow between countries a and b, Yab 
represents the economic size of countries a and b, Dab represents the physical distance 
between two countries, and Rab represents other factors that influence trade between 
them (Simmons, 2005: 17). The model is multiplicative: 
 
Tab = x(GDPa^b1 * GDPb^b2 * Rab^b3) /Dab^b4 
 
By taking the logarithms of all the terms, this multiplicative model can be transformed 
into a linear model. The gravity model then takes the following form: 37 
 
ln(Tab) = β0 + β1ln(GDPa) + β2 ln (GDPb) + β3 ln(Dab) + ln(Rab)
 
+µ 
 
This gravity model serves as a baseline for further analyses, both when I conduct the 
replication of Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006) and when I investigate the impact of 
IROs on cooperation and conflict. Other variables needed for the analyses will be 
added to the model, as parts of the term R in the equation above. µ represents the error 
term. Since conflict is considered a form of interaction, just like trade, the gravity 
model is also considered to be a suitable model to investigate the impact on conflict. 
4.3 Validity and reliability 
Without reliable data, the empirical analyses will not be valid. Reliability means trust, 
in a sense that the data‟s correctness can almost be taken for granted. If the coding of 
the data is repeated, the same result is obtained every time. It means that another 
researcher will get the exact same information if the same instruments are being used 
in the collection of the data, or when using the same methods. Most of the data used in 
this thesis have been previously used by Brochmann (2005) and by Brochmann & 
Gleditsch (2006). Empirical analyses based on the same data should normally yield 
same results. Most of the data have been used in publications by other scholars and in 
that sense been critically evaluated several times. Many of the variables used are parts 
                                              
37 In this model ln(R) will contain the rest of the variables in the analyses and the constant X becomes part of β0. 
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of larger well known databases such as the Transboundary Freshwater Spatial 
Database. This strengthens the reliability of the data. 
 
There will always be a risk of coding errors. I have coded some variables used in the 
analyses. The information coded is: the foundation date when both states in a dyad 
became members of the same IRO, whether or not states in a dyad are members of an 
IRO, when an IRO was first established in the dyad, and whether or not the states in 
the dyad are members of bilateral or multilateral IROs. These variables are completely 
new, coded by me and not tested earlier, which naturally makes them less reliable. I 
did however code the data twice to produce more reliable data. Coding data yourself 
give you more control over the data, but does not prevent any coding errors.  
 
To determine whether the research can be considered valid substantial theoretical 
theories and arguments have to lay the foundation. Fundamental in all empirical 
research is to discover factors that explain complex phenomena, like cooperation and 
conflict. Trade and joint membership in NGOs have been used as indicators of 
cooperation by other scholars as well (cf. Brochmann, 2005; Brochmann & Gleditsch, 
2006). Empirical studies using trade data have often yielded different results. This can 
be explained by low accuracy and reliability of official trade statistics, but also by how 
scholars choose to use the data. Scholars use different measures for trade and treat 
missing data differently. This can explain some divergent empirical results (Schneider 
et al., 2003: 28).  
 
The validity of the data used in this thesis is closely connected to the 
operationalization of the variables, the variables chosen, the coding accuracy, and how 
well the model fit the data. Many of the variables in these analyses are well known and 
commonly used as central in international relations. Earlier studies have used many of 
the variables in research on conflict /cooperation and water related issues e.g. 
Gleditsch et al. (2006), Wolf (1998, 2003) among others. Based on neoliberal 
institutionalism and liberal peace theory using trade and membership as indicators of 
cooperation is well substantiated. Brochmann (2005: 39) found in her two models, 
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using trade and membership as dependent variables, that the results point in the same 
direction. These findings strengthen the variables validity. 
4.4 Dependent variables38: cooperation and conflict 
4.4.1 Cooperation, dyadic trade, and joint IGO memberships 
To measure cooperation I use the same variables as in Brochmann (2005) and 
Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006), joint membership in international organizations and 
dyadic trade. Membership in IGOs is collected from the Correlates of War project 
(COW
39
). The choice of joint IGO membership as a measure of cooperation is based 
mostly on Keohane‟s (2005) theory of complex interdependence that broadly states 
that countries cooperate by joining organizations since there is no supranational, 
absolute authority in the world system. The idea is that membership in IGOs indicates 
willingness and extensive interaction between the members. States also interact more 
generally and dyadic trade is a good measure for this cooperation (Brochmann, 2005). 
Joint membership in IGOs is measured with the number of IGO memberships for both 
states in a given dyad. The dataset covers the period 1815 to 2000. The variable 
includes 495 different IGOs with a total of more than 500,000 members. The number 
of observations for my analyses will be substantially lower since they will cover a 
shorter time span and only include dyads on the same continents. Brochmann & 
Gleditsch (2006) and Brochmann (2005) used joint membership in IGOs as a 
dependent variable and as a measure for cooperation. The number of joint 
memberships from the COW data was summed up for each dyad. Since the IGO 
membership data are coded for every fifth year, the missing data was estimated 
through linear interpolation. The variable goes from 0 and up, with one decimal. The 
variable has been transformed by taking the square root, to better meet the 
requirements of OLS regression (Brochmann, 2005: 44). 
                                              
38 The codebook for the river basin data can be found at www.prio.no/cscw/envi/rivers. For more information about the 
dataset and variables, see Gleditsch et al. (2006). I have made no changes in the rivers dataset itself, but have added some 
new variables to it. 
39 For more information see www.correlatesofwar.org. 
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One objection to using IGOs as a measure for cooperation in this study is that my 
independent variables deal with membership in international river organizations. Both 
the independent variable and the dependent are similar, and there might be a high 
correlation between them. On the other hand, IROs constitute only a small proportion 
of all IGOs in the world, and dyads that are member of an IRO are probably members 
of many other IGOs, so that the variable still can serve as a measure for cooperation. 
 
The dyadic trade data are originally from Gleditsch (2002).
40
 The dataset includes 
import and export data for the period 1948–2000, measured in millions of US dollars 
at current prices. Since the data quality is best after 1950, I use 1950–2000 as the time 
period for the analyses. Trade is frequently used as an independent variable in studies 
of conflict, particularly to find out if trade reduces conflict (Gleditsch, 2002). In this 
analysis the dyadic trade variable will be seen as a second measure of cooperation. I 
use a variable created by Brochmann (2005) based on Gleditsch (2002) that measures 
the total imports in the dyad. This variable was log transformed to reduce the influence 
of extreme values and better meet the OLS regressions requirements (Brochmann, 
2005: 45). 
4.4.2 Conflict: The onset of a MID with at least one casualty 
To measure conflict, I use militarized interstate disputes and wars from the MID and 
COW projects
41
. As mentioned in Section 2.1, the COW project defines a conflict as a 
war if there are at least 1,000 battle deaths in a year. The UCDP/PRIO conflict dataset 
has a lower threshold of 25 battle deaths per year to qualify as an armed conflict 
(Gleditsch et al., 2002). They define armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility 
that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two 
parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle 
related deaths” (www.pcr.uu.se). Lowering the threshold makes it possible to include 
significant events like the conflict in Northern Ireland and the Basque conflict in Spain 
                                              
40 See http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html or Gleditsch (2002) for further information.  
41 Links to both datasets are found at www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
52 
 
which do not qualify for the COW project‟s list of wars (Gleditsch et al., 2002). For 
statistical purpose, lowering the threshold for inclusion will yield more conflicts and 
thus more flexibility regarding analyses of the material as well (Gleditsch et al., 2002). 
The Militarized Interstate (MID) Dispute Dataset includes militarized conflicts with no 
actual violence. This dataset also comes from the Correlates of War Project. MIDs 
include a range of low-level hostilities including threats to use force and displays of 
force. This dataset has been criticized for being less reliably coded and containing 
greater uncertainty regarding end and start dates of wars. “They also suffer from what 
might be called an ‟attention bias‟; while a war can scarcely be hidden from public 
view, a militarized dispute may not catch the attention of the media and thus will not 
have been caught by the COW coders” (Toset et al., 2000: 984). Toset et al. (2000: 
984) choose an intermediate solution to reduce this problem of attention bias by 
measuring conflict behavior as the onset of a MID with at least one casualty. The same 
operationalization is used by Gleditsch et al. (2006) and will be used here, too. It is a 
dummy variable, coded 1 if a MID was started in a given year and 0 otherwise. The 
years following the onset of the MID are coded 0, even if the MID continues. The low 
threshold yields more conflicts and is appropriate to my research question. Using the 
same variable as (Gleditsch et al., 2006) is also important in order to be able to 
compare the results. 
4.5 Independent variables and control variables  
In the following 4 independent variables are listed. The sources of the variables are 
from Dombrowsky‟s Table A-1 (2007:330). She lists 86 IROs, bilateral as well as 
multilateral. For each IRO she provides information about the basin name, the 
foundation date, the number of member states, the total number of states in the basin, 
and the IRO‟s issue areas (Dombrowsky, 2007, Table A-1: 330-360). These 
organizations are represented in 68 international river basins. These data are coded to 
distinguish between different combinations of dyads. For example if both countries in 
a dyad are members of the same IRO, none are members or only one is a member. 
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4.5.1 International river organization (IRO) in the dyad 
By coding the foundation dates I am able to test for differences in conflict and 
cooperation before and after the establishment of an international river organization in 
a dyad. This variable is coded with the year the first international river organization 
was founded in the dyad. I might find that even when only one of the states in a dyad 
is a member, the presence of the river organization will have an effect on conflict and 
cooperation in dyads which also share a river basin. The presence of an IRO probably 
increases the overall management in the shared basin, and this increases the interaction 
between them. I expect this variable to be positive related to cooperation and negative 
related to conflict. This effect is expected to be weaker compared to dyads where both 
states are members of the same IRO. The variable was recoded into a dichotomous 
variable. In the analyses dyads where no countries are members are given the code 0, 
and in dyads where there is an IRO the code is a 1.  
4.5.2 Both countries in dyad members of the same IRO 
This variable is coded with the foundation year of the first international river 
organization of which both states in the dyad are members. The variable was recoded 
into a dichotomous variable in the analyses, and given the code 1 if both countries are 
members of the same IRO in the same year, and given the code 0 otherwise. I expect 
dyads where both states are members of the same international river organization to 
have less conflict and more cooperation, compared to states that do not share 
membership. 
4.5.3 Both states member of same bilateral IRO 
The variable is disaggregated from the variable, Both countries in the dyad members 
of the same IRO. The dyad is coded 1 if there exists a bilateral IRO of which both 
states in a dyad are members, and 0 otherwise. The coding into bilateral and 
multilateral IROs is conducted since I expect there to be a difference between them, 
and that will be investigated in the analyses in Chapter 5. 
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4.5.4 Both states member of same multilateral IRO 
The variable is also disaggregated from the variable, Both countries in dyad members 
of the same IRO. The dyad is coded 1 if there exists a multilateral IRO of which both 
states in a dyad are members and 0 otherwise.  
4.5.5. Shared river basin 
This is a variable coded as a dummy variable which states whether or not two states 
share a river basin, regardless if they are contiguous or non-contiguous. Gleditsch et al. 
(2006: 373) found a positive and significant dyadic relationship between sharing a 
river basin and the onset of conflict, and that the risk of fatal MIDs (Military Interstate 
Disputes) is approximately doubled by the presence of a shared basin. Brochmann 
(2006: 59) found in her study that sharing a river basin has a positive and significant 
effect on cooperation. These findings calls for more research on water related issues, 
such as what impact and role the presence of an IRO has on conflict and cooperation. 
This variable was created by Gleditsch et al. (2006) as a part of their dataset
42
, which 
combines data from Toset et al. (2000), and Wolf‟s Transboundary River Basin 
Registry
43
. 
4.6 Control variables 
The control variables I use in the analyses, where I look at the effect IROs have on 
conflict, are basically the same as Gleditsch et al. (2006) use in their study. Many of 
the same control variables are also suitable as control variables when I look at the 
effect IROs have on cooperation. Control variables used are Peace history, Regime 
type, Level of development, Dyad size, Presence of one or more major powers within 
the dyad, Alliance, Inter-capital distance and Contiguity (Gleditsch et al., 2006). These 
variables are well established and widely used as explanatory factors within research 
on conflict and cooperation. 
 
When Gleditsch et al. (2006) analyzed the relationship between conflicts and shared 
river basins, they tested the significance of certain variables. Their results strongly 
                                              
42 Available at www.prio.no/cscw/datasets. 
43 Available at www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu. 
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suggest that the size of the basin is more important than either the river boundary 
length or the number of river crossings. Based on the results from that study I have 
added basin size as a control variable in addition to the ones mentioned above. I do not 
include river boundary length or number of river crossings as control variables. 
 
The danger of only using established “facts” is that the ability to engage in critical and 
unconventional thinking might be lessened, which will hurt the progress within 
research. There are no established truths and that has to be the foundation of all 
research.  
 
In the following section I justify my choice of control variables
44
, and discuss what 
results we might expect from the analyses. The choice of control variables is important 
to prevent crediting to the independent variable too much effect. For instance two 
states that are allied and highly developed tend to cluster geographically and allied 
dyads therefore appear to fight each other more frequently if one does not control for 
contiguity (Toset et al., 2000: 982). Using a large number of control variables makes it 
harder to determine the causal linkages between them. On the other hand fewer control 
variables means that we have probably left out essential information. The main 
purpose of this thesis is not to investigate the causal relationship between explanatory 
factors, but rather to test if membership in IROs has any additional effect on conflict 
and cooperation between states in a dyad. Based on this, implementing a large set of 
control variables is essential. All control variables that are of any significance should 
be present in the analyses. 
4.6.1 Peace history 
This variable is a decay function containing the number of previous years without 
militarized interstate dispute (MID) in the dyad or the time since the younger of the 
two countries gained independence. The variable was originally created to be a control 
for temporal dependence in conflict, which is widely used in logistic regressions. It is 
                                              
44 The control variables used in this thesis are the same as the ones used by Gleditsch et al. (2006), Brochmann & Gleditsch 
(2006) and Toset et al. (2000). 
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less common to include this in regular regression models (Brochmann & Gleditsch, 
2006: 14). This variable is included because there is reason to believe that previous 
levels of conflict in a dyad will have an independent impact on later conflicts. The 
variable will test for temporal dependence between the dyads (Toset et al., 2000). 
Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006) argue that it is reasonable to expect that positive 
interaction increases with years of peace in a dyad, while the risk of new conflicts 
decline. This argument makes sense, but I am not sure whether that effect will show 
positive or negative. One might think that cooperation is more likely when there is a 
long history of peace, but it can also be looked at the other way around, that a history 
of conflict really calls for necessary cooperation to prevent further damaging conflicts. 
The eagerness and effort to cooperate in a dyad might therefore be higher with a 
history of conflicts. Irrespective of positive or negative effects, this is an important 
choice of control. The variable is created by Gleditsch et al. (2006) but the original 
idea behind the creation of the variable belongs to Raknerud & Hegre (2007)  
4.6.2 Regime type45  
On the basis of the well established liberal peace argument, this variable is an 
important control. The democratic peace argument claims that two democracies rarely, 
if ever, fight one another. However, democracies may be involved in wars with other 
regime types. A dyad containing two democracies will therefore presumably 
automatically have fewer conflicts than “mixed” dyads, supposing that the liberal 
peace argument is true. The variable is included in the analyses as three dummy 
variables. The reference category consists of two democracies. The variables are 
labelled One democracy, Two autocracies and Unconsolidated regime according to the 
political make up of the dyad. For a dyad to be labelled One democracy, one of the 
countries has to have a value of 6 or higher on the Polity IV scale (democracy minus 
autocracy) drawn from the Polity IV Dataset. In Two autocracies, both countries have 
–6 or lower. In Unconsolidated regime dyads at least one of the countries has a value 
between –5 and 5 and the other has 5 or below (Brochmann & Gleditsch, 2006). The 
                                              
45 See www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm for a description of the dataset and variable used. 
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scale goes from -10 to + 10. The variable is originally taken from the Polity IV scale 
of democracy and autocracy which is an updated version of the Polity Project. 
4.6.3 Dyad size  
There has been a renewed interest of the role of geography in international relations 
(Starr, 2002). War will naturally be more likely between states that are close to each 
other. Of course, this does not prevent wars over long distances. Today‟s technology 
makes long distance war much more feasible. There are however some arguments why 
both more cooperation and more conflicts between states that are geographically 
proximate might be expected, like the distance between capitals, number of roads 
crossings, railroad crossings, steepness of the terrain etc. (Starr, 2002: 248). The more 
contact points, the more interaction, regardless of the nature of the contact (peaceful, 
conflictual, etc.). That‟s the main intention for implementing control variables like, 
Inter-capital distance, Contiguity, and Dyad size etc.  
 
Dyad size is measured by population and coded for the largest and smallest country in 
the dyad. The variable has been log transformed. This variable is the same as used in 
Brochmann & Gleditsch‟s (2006) study. In an earlier study by Gleditsch et al. (2006), 
a similar population variable showed to be highly significant and positively related to 
conflict. Since Gleditsch et al. (2006) found that proximity increased the conflict levels 
in a dyad it is likely that similar results regarding cooperation will be found; that 
proximity is positively related to cooperation, since higher populations usually give 
more need and opportunities for contact. A dyad‟s GDP can also be seen as a measure 
of size. GDP variables are also included in the analyses as a measurement for 
development, thoroughly described under Section 4.6.8. The dyad size variable is from 
the COW Project. 
4.6.4 Inter-capital distance  
Inter-capital distance and Contiguity are included because there are expected more 
interaction between neighboring or proximate states, as mentioned in Section 4.6.3. 
Gleditsch et al. (2006: 372) found that more distance between the capitals in a dyad 
significantly reduces the probability of conflict. They also found that greater length of 
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a shared boundary slightly increases the propensity for conflict. Buhaug and Gleditsch 
(2006), among other scholars, have also found that distance is negatively and 
significantly related to conflicts even when controlling for contiguity. Based on these 
articles the effect of geography should be tested with several control variables, Dyad 
size, Contiguity and Inter-capital distance because they individually have explanatory 
power. Inter-capital distance is measured in kilometres, but has been log transformed 
to decrease extreme values. This variable is from the COW Project. 
4.6.5 Contiguity 
Contiguity is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if two states share a border and 0 
otherwise. It is reasonable to expect that a shared boundary will give more interaction 
between the states sharing it. This variable would be expected to have effect both on 
conflict and cooperation. Countries with common boundaries are more likely to have 
more conflict and more cooperation, and this variable will be implemented in the 
analyses as a control. The substantial argument here is the same as in Section 4.3.3 
above. All the variables measuring proximity will be regarded as important controls.  
4.6.6 Presence of one or more major powers within the dyad  
This variable comes from the COW project. It is a standard dichotomous variable and 
the dyad-years are coded with a 1 if there is at least one major power in the dyad. 
When one state is a major power it has a large capability advantage over the other 
states. This will most presumably affect both conflict and cooperation. On one hand 
the presence of a major power can show to be stabilizing but it can also show opposite 
effects. Homer-Dixon (1994) emphasizes that the military power balance between 
upstream and downstream states in a river basin influences the potential for conflict, 
especially if the downstream state is more powerful e.g. Egypt. To test this, Major 
power is included as a control. This also applies for testing cooperation. The presence 
of a major power can boost cooperation but probably also limit it. The major power 
can force through cooperation if desired, but can also act in self-interest, disregarding 
other states, and creating conflict. It is assumed that the geographical position to the 
international river plays a decisive role in the outcome. This thesis does not test for 
upstream/downstream scenarios. It would be interesting to test for different scenarios 
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between two such states regarding water, e.g. we might find that an international water 
basin with a major power upstream will not cooperate as much as when the Major 
Power is located downstream. This scenario, among others, can serve for another 
paper.  
4.6.7 Alliance  
The Correlates of War (COW) project lists three types of alliances: defense pacts, 
neutrality pacts, and ententes. The variable used here is a dichotomous variable. It is 
coded 1 if there is an alliance in a dyad, and 0 otherwise. An alliance concluded in one 
year is coded from the next year, and an alliance ended in a particular year is coded as 
a non-alliance from that same year. An alliance formed and ended in the same year is 
not coded at all (Toset et al., 2000: 985). Gleditsch et al. (2006: 372) found that 
alliance was not a significant predictor for conflict. The variable may show to be 
significant when I test for cooperation. I have therefore decided to keep it as a control 
variable for the analyses. The theoretical argument is that it seems feasible to assume 
that allied countries are more likely to cooperate. 
4.6.8 Level of development 
All states have conflicts, and the level of development is thought to be a determinant 
of whether states go to war. Some scholars expect higher levels of development to 
generate less conflict and more cooperation (Hegre, 2000: 5ff). The variable might 
show opposite results too. It is my expectation that we will find more conflict in the 
dyads consisting of either very poor or very rich countries, like a U-curve. Very poor 
countries do not have much to lose on a conflict but probably a lot to gain, whereas 
very rich states can afford even long-lasting warfare without risking much. Highly 
developed states often have more resources with which to pursue their interest, and 
they have the military capabilities to pursue, or threaten to pursue, their interest. 
Average states have something to lose and uncertainty when it comes to financing 
conflicts and the outcome of it. Another reason that we might expect more cooperative 
behavior in average states, and less conflict, is that they often have ample water 
resources. With restraints on the water supply they probably have the technology and 
resources available to conserve the water resource in a sustainable way. “Therefore, 
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when countries sharing a river basin also have a relatively high level of economic 
development, we would expect less overall strain on the water resources in the dyad” 
(Gleditsch et al., 2006: 370). Gleditsch et al. (2006: 376 ff.) found economic 
development to be significantly related to less conflict in the bivariate analysis, but 
unrelated to conflict in the multivariate analysis. Their analysis shows that the more 
developed a dyad, the less is the increased risk resulting from sharing a river basin. 
The substantial argument for this claim is that wealthier states have the means to cope 
with resource crises and to make use of advanced water management technology. 
Other scholars have found mixed results regarding this variable.  
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is commonly used to measure development 
levels. In these analyses development is measured as GDP per capita in the smallest 
economy and GDP in the largest economy. The variables have been log transformed. I 
distinguish between the largest and the smallest economy, since it is likely that the 
differences in economic size influence the level of conflict and cooperation differently. 
For instance it is likely that the smallest economy will have a larger negative impact 
on cooperation by having fewer means or resources which limits their possibilities. 
The GDP data covers a time span from 1950 and is from Gleditsch (2002). 
4.6.9 Water scarcity  
It seems reasonable to expect that conflict over water resources are more likely in 
water-scarce regions, especially if states sharing a river place a high value on the 
resource. The need for cooperation will also be greater where water resources are 
limited. I therefore expect this to have effect and implement this as an important 
choice of control. In water-scarce areas, like the Middle East, we might find that 
membership in IROs shows positive effect, promoting cooperation and reducing 
conflicts. Scarcity is measured through drought. The variable is coded as a dummy 
variable (drought) that records whether or not one or both countries experienced at 
least one drought at any time during the past 5 years from 1975 to 2000 (Gleditsch et 
al., 2006: 369). The substantial argument for bringing this variable in as an important 
choice of control is that it is likely to expect that conflicts over water will be more 
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frequent in regions where water is considered a scarce resource. At least that is what 
the water scarcity literature suggests; that basin-sharing countries in water-scarce 
regions probably have a higher risk of dispute than basin-sharing countries elsewhere 
(Gleditsch et al., 2006: 376). This scenario was not supported in Gleditsch et al.‟s 
(2006) study. It may be found that states with endemic water scarcity, and that also 
share a water basin, have long term incentives to cooperate over the management of 
the resource. It might follow that more cooperation between states in water-scarce 
regions as well as increased potential for conflicts is present. The information 
regarding water scarcity is originally from EM-DAT
46
, which is an international 
disaster database. 
4.6.10 Size of a shared basin47  
Gleditsch et al. (2006: 373) found that basin size shows a positive and significant 
effect on conflict. The bigger the shared basin the more there is to fight over. This 
might sound odd since earlier arguments have emphasized that water scarcity may 
increase conflict, while ample supply of water probably would show opposite effect. 
This effect can probably be indirectly linked to higher levels of development which 
causes increased need of water for industrial and agricultural purposes. Gleditsch et al. 
(2006: 373) controlled for both the size of the two countries, major power status, and 
the length of the border between them which make them highly certain that basin size 
has independent effect on conflicts. On the other hand they do not leave out the 
possibility that there might be a spurious effect caused by variables not taken into 
consideration. The effect may be indirectly dependent on water as mentioned above 
e.g. for industrial purposes, because of population densities, fisheries and other 
activities linked to the river which has had an historic economic importance (Gleditsch 
et al., 2006: 373). The variable is measures by the log of the total size of the basin in 
square kilometres shared by the dyad. 
 
                                              
46 See, www.emdat.be/.  
47 This variable is originally from Aaron Wolf‟s Transboundary Fresh Water Dispute Database at Oregon State University. 
See www.transboundarywaters.ors.edu/.  
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I start with a large number of control variables but may drop some of them in further 
analyses if they are found to be insignificant. 
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5.0 Analyses 
On the basis of the collected variables, several analyses will be conducted. Bivariate 
and multivariate, OLS and logit models will be used to investigate the relationship 
between membership in IROs and conflict/cooperation. First, I ran descriptive 
statistics on all variables, checked normal distributions, histograms, residuals, 
correlation matrixes, scatter plots, heteroskedasticity etc..
48
 Describing problems and 
consequences with heteroskedasticity is much easier than detecting it in the data, and 
when it is detected it is not obvious how to correct the problem. To test for any 
problems with heteroskedasticity, I ran an OLS regression on the assumption that there 
is no heteroskedasticity with both my dependent variables dyadic trade and IGO 
memberships with all my independent variables in the model and created a residual (z) 
variable. Investigating the residuals
49
, together with educated guesswork, speculations, 
empirical experience etc., can hopefully tell us where and why we have a problem with 
heteroskedasticity. I squared the z variable to avoid the possibility that the variance 
around the regression line would eliminate each other. After doing this I ran bivariate 
regression analyses for all the independent variables towards the residual of the 
dependent variables. All 24 analyses, except two, resulted in significant results. Only 
shared basin yielded insignificant result for the dyadic trade residual variable and GDP 
per capita yielded insignificant results using the residual variable for joint IGO 
memberships. The theory (Gujarati, 2003: 387ff) states that if I gain significant results 
I most likely have heteroskedasticity, which can cause some problems. By taking one 
and one variable and running bivariate OLS regression analyses, I can find out which 
variable is causing the problem, and decide if the variable can be transformed to make 
the residuals homoskedastic, if its presence can be accepted, or if the variable should 
be excluded. This exploration of the data is called the Park test (Gujarati, 2003: 403). 
Objections to this test are that the residual variable itself can be heteroskedastic and 
                                              
48 Only some results of the inspection of the variables will be reported in Appendix 2.  
49 The residual plots for Dyadic trade and Joint IGO membership, in Appendix 2, indicate that there is some 
heteroskedasticity. 
64 
 
therefore violate the OLS assumptions. Another objection to this method is the large 
number of cases. Reaching significant results using the squared residual is very 
common when the number of cases is high. To take an example, a correlation of 0.2 
can give a significant result with about 100 cases. Since I have more than 83,000 
observations the Park test does not contribute any valuable information. My bivariate 
analyses show that almost all my variable yield significant results. By this test we 
cannot interpret that we do or do not have serious heteroskedasticity problems. 
Concluding either way would be a mistake based on this test for this particular dataset. 
The data need more investigation and the scatter plots of the residuals give some 
support to heteroskedasticity since the residuals do not completely follow the 
regression line
50
. The heteroskedasticity seem much larger for the residuals of the 
regression analyses with IGO membership as dependent variable than for trade.  
 
The correlation matrix of all the independent variables reports satisfactory correlations 
for almost all the variables. The correlation is high between the variable Largest GDP 
per capita in the dyad and Smallest GDP per capita in the dyad. This is unproblematic 
since they are used only as control variables. A much more serious problem is the high 
correlation of 0.82 between the main independent variable, Shared basin and 
Contiguity, since I built my research question on the assumption that sharing a water 
basin is significantly related to states‟ interaction. This is further discussed in Section 
5.1. The rest of the correlations were all between 0.52 and 0.01. Correlations below 0.5 
do not usually create any serious problems. Values above 0.8 are critical.  
 
The results from the inspection of the variables were somewhat surprising. If the 
residual of a variable is not normal distributed they are not perfect to meet the 
conditions for using certain statistical models. The real world is very complex to 
represent in simple models and variables often do not have a perfect fit to the 
requirements of different methods
51
. My aim with this thesis is not to solve all the 
                                              
50 See residual plots in Appendix 2 
51 Most of the variables in this thesis are widely used by scholars both in international relations and in economics.  
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technical obstacles and weaknesses with the data. I have tried to point out problems 
and ways to solve them as satisfactorily as possible within the framework in this 
thesis. I have decided that the requirements are satisfied for the variables I use in what 
follows. 
5.1 Replication of Brochmann & Gleditsch  
Before analyzing my own data I start with a replication of the logistic analyses of 
shared water basin and conflict in Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006: 15, Model 2) to see 
if my data and method yield more or less the same results. It will confirm that 
changing statistical programs does not change the results in any drastic way, as long as 
one uses the same method and data. Their article focuses on the assumption that shared 
water resources provide both willingness and opportunity for interaction, and that it 
can generate more conflicts as well as cooperation. They found support for this 
hypothesis in the multivariate analyses of all dyads capable of sharing a river basin for 
the period 1950–2000. Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006) used GLS regression for shared 
IGO memberships and trade, and logistic regression to test for conflict, using the 
gravity model as a baseline. Some changes had to be made to be able to replicate the 
analyses of dyadic trade and IGO membership in Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006). 
SPSS does not have a GLS regression model or a regression model with panel-
corrected standard errors (SPCE). This makes an exact replication of their analyses 
difficult. Using SPSS, I was only able to replicate the logistic regression analyses of 
shared basin and conflict. The test for the cooperation variables had to be done as a 
second best alternative, by including lagged dependent variables as controls for 
autocorrelation
52
, as mentioned above in Section 4.2.2. The results from these analyses 
were somewhat different for many of the variables, and are discussed below. The 
results from Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006) and the results from the replication are 
reported in Table 5.1.  
 
                                              
52 According to Håvard Hegre (personal communication, 12 October 2009), a lagged dependent variable takes away a major 
part of the problems of autocorrelation. 
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Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006) found support for their hypothesis that dyads sharing a 
river basin have more overall interaction, positive as well as negative. They found that 
sharing a river basin had a significant positive relationship to MID onset, Joint IGO 
memberships and Dyadic trade, even when controlling for the other factors in the 
model. Thus, shared water resources increase conflict as well as cooperation. My 
replication of the logistic regression for conflict is consistent with their finding (Model 
1). This will serve as a basis for further research. Models 2 and 3, especially the latter, 
deviate from the earlier study. Particularly problematic is the main independent 
variable, Shared basin. The OLS regression in SPSS gives hardly any effect for this 
variable at all with a coefficient of 0.002 (Table 5.1 Model 6) when including the 
lagged dyadic trade variable as control. While Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006) found 
that sharing a water basin increases trade, I find that trade is not significantly 
influenced one way or the other. When the lagged trade variable is left out, the 
coefficient; -0.160, is significant at the p = 0.01 level, but in the wrong direction – 
sharing a river decreases trade. This was my main problem with the replication. The 
problem can be due to collinearity since Shared basin and Contiguity have a 
correlation of 0.82. Correlation this high is critical and it makes it hard to distinguish 
which variable really is the most influential. This is proved by my replication. As 
Table 5.1, Model 4 shows, both variables, Contiguity and Shared basin, are significant 
and the effects combined are the same. However, I get the strongest effect for the 
Contiguity variable whereas Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006) got the strongest effect 
for the Shared basin variable. Which variable is estimated to have the strongest effect 
is somewhat arbitrary when the two variables are highly correlated as they are here. 
Since most countries sharing river basins are neighbors the correlation is necessarily 
high, but approximately 1/3 of the dyad-years sharing a river basin are not neighbors 
(Brochmann & Gleditsch 2006: 15). Excluding either Shared basin or Contiguity 
strengthens the results for the other variable. To test for this I ran two logistics 
analyses excluding either Contiguity or Shared basin. When Contiguity was excluded 
most of the effect was ascribed to the Shared basin variable and vice versa. 
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Table 5.1: Analyses of states’ interaction 
 Results from Brochmann & 
Gleditsch (2006: 14, Models 2–4) 
Results replication of  
Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006) 
Variables / Model 
1 
MID 
onset 
2 
Joint IGO 
memb.ship 
3 
Dyadic 
trade 
4 
MID 
onset 
5 
Joint IGO 
membership 
6 
Dyadic trade 
Independent variable       
Shared basin 0.786** 
(1.33) 
0.111*** 
(2.40) 
0.400*** 
(7.57) 
0.543*** 
(0.14) 
0.028***#0.015*** 
(0.04) (0.02) 
–0.160***#0.002 
(0.03) (0.02) 
Gravity model       
Inter-capital distance 
(log) 
–0.671*** 
(4.54) 
–0.146*** 
(4.55) 
–0.992*** 
(21.44) 
–0.613*** 
(0.05) 
–0.113***#–0.032*** 
(0.003) (0.001) 
–0,848***#–.143*** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Contiguity 0.520** 
(0.54) 
–0.110*** 
(2.07) 
0.028 
(12.27) 
0.836*** 
(0.15) 
0.085***#0.063*** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
1.038***#0.216*** 
(0.34) (0.017) 
Population in the largest 
country (log) 
0.231*** 
(2.05) 
0.027*** 
(2.88) 
0.398*** 
(5.90) 
0.218*** 
(0.04) 
–0.001#0.002** 
(0.002) (0.001) 
0.418***#0.075*** 
(0.01) (0.003) 
Population in the 
smallest country (log) 
0.367*** 
(3.19) 
0.149*** 
(5.65) 
0.797*** 
(37.54) 
0.354*** 
(0.04) 
0.104***#0.022*** 
(0.002) (0.001) 
0.723***#0.128*** 
(0.01) (0.003) 
GDP per capita of the 
largest economy (log) 
0.295** 
(0.34) 
0.047*** 
(2.42) 
0.765*** 
(9.16) 
0.275*** 
(0.07) 
–0.032***#–0.002 
(0.003) (0.001)  
0.738***#0.133*** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
GDP per capita smallest 
economy (log) 
–0.428*** 
(1.43) 
0.106*** 
(3.06) 
0.886*** 
(19.05) 
–0.425*** 
(0.08) 
0.127***#0.019*** 
(0.003) (0.002) 
1.058***#0.164*** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
Major power –0.077 
(2.01) 
–0.356*** 
(0.26) 
0.953*** 
(16.04) 
–0.067 
(0.16) 
–0.224***#–0.041*** 
(0.009) (0.004) 
0.836***#0.107*** 
(0.03) (0.01) 
Other control variables       
Peace history –3.509*** 
(7.48) 
0.493*** 
(26.73) 
0.256*** 
(116.97) 
–3.484*** 
(0.09) 
0.961***#0.738*** 
(0.009) (0.004) 
1.004***#0.784*** 
(0.03) (0.01) 
One democracy 1.264*** 
(2.32) 
–0.060*** 
(3.68) 
–0.229*** 
(10.82) 
1.288*** 
(0.23) 
–0.416***#–0.089*** 
(0.009) (0.004) 
–0.991***#–.165*** 
(0.02) (0.01) 
Two autocracies 1.443*** 
(1.29) 
–0.080*** 
(3.66) 
–0.266*** 
(11.77) 
1.477*** 
(0.24) 
–0.490***#–0.108*** 
(0.008) (0.004) 
–1.106***#–
0.175*** 
(0.03) (0.01) 
Unconsolid. regimes 1.705*** 
(2.55) 
–0.084*** 
(4.49) 
–0.294*** 
(13.01) 
1.707*** 
(0.24) 
–0.513***#–0.113*** 
(0.008) (0.008) 
–1.150***–0.174*** 
(0.03) (0.01) 
Lag dyadic trade      #0.841*** 
(0.002) 
Lag IGO membership     #0.781*** 
(0.002) 
 
Constant –7.718*** 
(3.61) 
1.598*** 
(4.40) 
–14.907*** 
(19.54) 
–7.811*** 
(0.76) 
2.939***#0.743*** 
(0.04) (0.02) 
–15.847***#–
2.71*** 
(0.13) (0.07) 
Hosmer-Lem. p-value    0.17   
Pseudo-R
2
 (Nag.k)    0.42   
R
2
 (OLS)     0.33 (0.83) 0.69 (0.93) 
(n) 83,406 82,218 83,400 83,406 82,019 83,404 
Results with lagged dependent variable (dyadic trade and IGO membership) marked #. 
Robust z statistics in model 1,2,and 3, and S.E. in model 4,5, and 6 in parentheses 
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Most of the control variables in the replication show similar results when including or 
not including the lagged variable. But comparing the results with Models 2 and 3 in 
Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006), the results are quite different, except for the variables 
in the gravity model. These differences seem most likely to occur from the fact that I 
use OLS with a lagged dependent variable with SPSS, whereas Brochmann & 
Gleditsch (2006) used GLS regression with lagged panel corrected standard errors 
with STATA. In my analyses, the lagged dependent variables steal a lot of the effect 
from other variables, but excluding the lagged variables means ignoring the problem 
of autocorrelation. I decided to report both variants to show the differences in the 
estimates.  
 
Since I did not succeed in my replication of Models 2 and 3 I have decided to abandon 
further investigation of the determinants of cooperation. Instead, I concentrate on a 
more detailed analysis of the determinants of conflict, and in particular my IRO 
variables. I will only be able to answer a part of my research question, and to test 
Hypotheses 1, 3, 5, and 7 in the following analyses. 
 
The control variables in Model 1 and in my Model 4 all perform very much in 
accordance with the theoretical assumptions. Peace history has a negative effect on 
conflict. Regime type with Two democracies as the reference category is the most 
stable. All the dummy variables controlling for regime type are positive in relation to 
the reference category in the model of MID onset, meaning that two democracies are 
less likely to start a conflict. All the variables show significant results which support 
the liberal peace theory, mentioned earlier in Sections 1.2, 2.1, and 4.6.2. The gravity 
model underlines the importance of proximity. The logical arguments for using the 
gravity model as a baseline model for states‟ interaction is also clearly supported since 
the impacts of the gravity variables are considerable (Brochmann & Gleditsch, 2006: 
18). Almost all variables in the gravity model show significant results. An exception is 
that Major power does not have a significant effect on MID onset, although it comes 
close. The GDP variables display some collinearity problems. GDP in the largest dyad 
correlates with GDP in the smallest dyad at 0.87. This is critically high. The 
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collinearity test gives a tolerance value of 0.192 and VIF value of 5.203 for the 
smallest GDP in the dyad and tolerance value of 0.223 and VIF value of 4.887 for the 
largest GDP in the dyad. The standard error of the estimates is doubled when VIF is 
4.0 and tolerance is .25. This will lead to overlapping confidence intervals and the 
likelihood of finding any significant results is reduced. Generally, a tolerance value 
less than 0.3 and a VIF value over 3 indicate multicollinearity, although scholars use 
different cut-off points. A cut-off value of VIF=4 is arbitrary but common for deciding 
when a given independent variable displays too much multicollinearity, but some 
researchers use the more lenient cut-off of 5 or even 10.
53
 A researcher may wish to 
drop the variable with the highest VIF if multicollinearity is indicated and the theory 
warrants it. My analyses indicate that there is some collinearity, but since these 
variables are in the gravity model and I use them as controls I decided to keep them in 
the further analyses.  
 
In the replication of the logistic regression analyses on MID onset, the Hosmer–
Lemeshow test, which gauges the overall fit of the model, shows acceptable level with 
a p-value of 0.17.  
 
The dyad-years for the next analyses will be considerably reduced since I will analyze 
dyads from 1950 to 2000 sharing an international river basin. This reduces the dyads 
from approximately 83,406 dyad-years to 11,111 dyad-years. Of 86 IROs, 79 were 
founded after 1950. When the drought variable is included, results are reported from 
1975–2000 which reduces the observations to 5,780. 
5.2 The impact of IROs on conflict  
The next step in the analysis is to include the IRO variables in the conflict model. In 
Table 5.2 I report the results from bivariate analyses for two independent variables 
measuring IRO membership for all dyads between 1950 and 2000. One is whether 
                                              
53 See http://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/regress.htm#toleranc. 
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both countries in the dyad are members of the same IRO, the other whether at least one 
of the countries is a member of an IRO. 
 
 
Table 5.2 Bivariate analyses of the effects of IROs on MID onset 
Variables MID onset 
IRO in dyad 1.717*** (0.072) 
Both members of same IRO 1.591*** (0.086) 
N 83406 
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p<0.01. S.E. in parentheses 
 
Both IRO membership variables were significantly associated with conflict in bivariate 
analyses. The exp(1.717) means that the odds are 5.5 times higher for MID onset in 
dyads where at least one country is member of an IRO. In other words, the likelihood 
for conflict is considerable higher in dyads with at least one IRO compared to other 
dyads without any IRO memberships. In dyads where both states are members of the 
same IRO the odds for MID onset decrease to about 4.9 (exp(1.591)), but the 
likelihood is still much higher than for other dyads. 
 
In Table 5.3 I report the result for the same IRO variables in a full logistic regression 
analysis with all dyads from 1950–2000 with the same control variables as in Table 
5.1. I do not report the control variables from Model 5.1, since the estimates and their 
significance barely changed when adding the IRO variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the full regression model both IRO membership variables remain significant at the 
1% level. As expected, the effect decreased relative to the bivariate analysis. The odds 
of MID onset in dyads with at least one country being member of an IRO are approx. 
 
Table 5.3 Multivariate logistic regression analyses of the effect 
of IROs on MID onset 
Variables MID onset 
IRO in dyad 0.450*** (0.095) 
Both members of same IRO 0.413*** (0.086) 
N 83406 
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p<0.01. S.E. in parentheses 
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1.6 (exp(0.450)) compared to dyads without membership in an IRO. The same applies 
for dyads where both countries are members of the same IRO. The odds for conflict 
are approximately 1.5 compared to dyads where both countries are not members of the 
same IRO. 
 
The results are counterintuitive and do not support any of my hypotheses regarding the 
impact of IROs on conflict. We often obtain significant results when the number of 
observations is high, almost regardless of what variables we include in our model. 
However, the results in Models 5.2 and 5.3 are not supported by theory. Why would 
IROs stimulate conflict? One possibility for the puzzling result is that the analysis 
includes dyads that do not share a joint water resource? I decided to eliminate these 
dyads and include only dyads sharing an international river basin, since it is here we 
would expect a shared IRO to have an impact. 
5.2.1 The impact of IROs on conflict in dyads sharing a river basin 
First I will investigate international river organization‟s effect on conflicts for all 
dyads sharing a river basin between 1950 and 2000. Following Gleditsch et al. (2006) I 
include basin size and drought as additional control variables
54
. Gleditsch et al. found 
basin to have a positive and significant effect on conflict. This runs counter to the idea 
of scarcity causing conflict, but the size of the basin might be a measure of the total 
value of the resource. The greater the value, the more to compete for, and the greater 
the potential importance of an IRO as a management tool. The scarcity variable will 
pick up whether or not water scarcity also matters. In theory, a large shared basin 
might be even more important to a water-scarce country. Based on this assumption I 
decided to include an interaction term between the basin size variable and my main 
independent variable, Both countries in dyad member of same IRO, and the same for 
drought. 
 
The estimates from variables in bivariate analyses compared to the estimates from the 
same variables in analyses with multiple variables sometimes differ. If they do, it is a 
                                              
54 The substantial argument for this can be found in Sections 4.6.7, 4.6.9, and 4.6.10, and is therefore not repeated here. 
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strong indicator of confounding variables. Often variables tend to appear together 
which makes it hard to distinguish the relative significance of each variable. The 
estimates will be wrong and also the standard errors, which makes them harder to 
interpret substantially. This may lead to results that are not significant even if it is most 
likely that the variables, or at least one of them, are important factors. The problem of 
multicolinearity in multiple regression analyses is often present in social science, and 
the problem becomes even more relevant when an interaction term is added into the 
model which is often done to create a better model fit. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test is 
very useful in logistic multiple regression analyses and helps to explore the 
multiplicative nature of the model. 
 
Ultimately this might lead to a false interpretation of the relationship between the 
dependent and the independent variables. The likelihood ratio test is useful to avoid 
falling into this trap. When two or more variables are confounded one way to solve the 
problem is to create one variable out of the confounding ones and add that variable to 
the model instead, but that complicates the substantial interpretation of the model. 
 
The dependent variable is still dichotomous, so I continue with a logistic regression 
analysis. I first conducted a full multivariate logistic regression with MID onset as 
dependent and all the control variables from the replication (Model 7, Table 5.4) to see 
if it makes a difference that I now only analyze dyads sharing a river basin. Model 7 
has only minor deviations in the estimates for all variables except Contiguity and GDP 
in the largest country in the dyad. Contiguity is no longer significant, which is 
surprising, since it is usually very robustly associated with conflict.
55
 The reason why 
Contiguity is no longer significant might be due to the strong effects from the other 
variables included in the gravity model, since we now only analyze dyads sharing an 
international river. The dyads in this analysis are therefore more likely to be more 
proximate than dyads not sharing an international river. To check this I conducted an 
                                              
55 In the replication the correlation between Shared basin and Contiguity caused a serious correlation problem. See Section 
5.1. 
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analysis with Inter-capital distance excluded, which led Contiguity to be significant at 
the 1% level. There is no sign of collinearity between Contiguity and the other 
independent variables, judging from their intercorrelations and from tolerance and VIF 
tests. Contiguity had a tolerance value of 0.855 and VIF value of 1.170, and Inter-
capital distance had a tolerance value of 0.497 and VIF of 2.13, which is acceptable
56
. 
The correlation between Contiguity and Inter-capital distance is not very high at 0.28. 
Since Contiguity becomes insignificant when Inter-capital distance is included, I 
exclude Contiguity from further analyses. Inter-capital distance has a coefficient of –
0.808 in Model 7, meaning that the odds of conflict are approximately 0.4 (exp (–
0.808)) for dyads with proximate capitals, compared to other dyads.  
 
In Model 7 there are some collinearity problems between the two GDP variables, 
between Major Power and Population in the smallest dyad, and also between the two 
Population variables, but I am not concerned here with the relative importance of the 
control variables. Multicollinearity among the control variables does not affect my 
research question as long as none of them correlate highly with my independent 
variable, and none of them do. I decided to keep the problematic control variables for 
which VIF was barely above 5.  
 
                                              
56 See Appendix 2 for collinearity diagnostics. I only report one matrix to give an example, but have run tolerance tests for all 
my analyses. 
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The regime type variables were all significant compared to the reference group (Two 
democracies), as expected from liberal peace theory. Surprisingly, dyads with a major 
power have less conflict, although the relationship is not significant. However, 
 
Table 5.4 Results of logistic regression of MID onset 1950–2000, full model 
 MID onset 
Variables /Model 7 8 9 10 11 
IRO in the dyad  0.099    
  (0.103)    
Both member of same IRO   0.097 
(0.109) 
  
Bilateral IRO in the dyad    0.186 
(0.154) 
 
Multilateral IRO in the dyad     –0.110 
(0.137) 
Gravity model      
Inter-capital distance (log) –0.808*** 
(0.078) 
–0.803*** 
(0.077) 
–0.800*** 
(0.079) 
–0.792*** 
(0.085) 
–0.831*** 
(0.082) 
Contiguity –0. 01 
(0.19) 
    
Population in the largest 
country (log) 
0.275*** 
(0.058) 
0.225*** 
(0.051) 
0.226*** 
(0.051) 
0.235*** 
(0.055) 
0.241*** 
(0.055) 
Population in the smallest 
country (log) 
0.275*** 
(0.056) 
0.292*** 
(0.056) 
0.290*** 
(0.056) 
0.282*** 
(0.058) 
0.284*** 
(0.058) 
GDP per capita in the largest 
economy (log) 
 0.068 
(0.103) 
0.034 
(0.105) 
–0.035 
(0.105) 
0,050 
(0.107) 
0.039 
(0.108) 
GDP per capita in the smallest 
economy (log) 
–0.353** 
(0.115) 
–0.364*** 
(0.115) 
–0.366*** 
(0.115) 
–0.383*** 
(0.1189 
–0.357*** 
(0.117) 
Major power –0.316 
(0.208) 
    
Other control variables      
Peace history –3.366*** 
(0.122) 
–3.361*** 
(0.120) 
–3.362*** 
(0.120) 
–3.323*** 
(0.124) 
–3.321*** 
(0.124) 
One democracy 1.048*** 
(0.258) 
1.001*** 
(0.255) 
0.995*** 
(0.255) 
0.950*** 
(0.257) 
0.942*** 
(0.256) 
Two autocracies 1.155*** 
(0.274) 
1.108*** 
(0.273) 
1.101*** 
(0.271) 
0.993*** 
(0.274) 
0.984*** 
(0.273) 
Unconsolidated regimes 1.257*** 
(0.264) 
1.200*** 
(0.261) 
1.195*** 
(0.261) 
1,128*** 
(0.263) 
1.121*** 
(262) 
Size of shared basin  –0.031 
(0.036) 
–0.029 
(0.036) 
–0.041 
(0.037) 
–0.018 
(0.042) 
Size shared bas.*both member    –0.042 
(0.061) 
  
Constant  –3.528*** 
(0.998) 
–2.562*** 
(0.984) 
–2.551* 
(–0.981) 
–2.371** 
(0.989) 
–2.541*** 
(0.988) 
Hosmer–Lemeshov p-value 0.95 0.40 0.68 0.34 0.561 
Pseudo-R2 (Nag.k) 0.389 0.385 0.385 0.384 0.384 
-2LL 2,877.7 2,878.8 2,878.2 2697.2 2697.9 
(n) 11,111 11,111 11,111 11,111 11,420 
Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses 
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006: 15) did not find any significant result for this variable 
either. Major power correlates 0.65 with Largest population in the dyad. Thus, the 
standard error of the estimates increases by more than 25%. Together with fewer 
observations (11,111 instead of 83,406), this might explain why this variable is not 
significant.  
5.2.2 IROs in the dyad and MID onset  
Model 8 seeks to test Hypothesis 1, whether dyads with at least one IRO membership 
have a lower propensity for conflict. Basin size is included as an additional control 
variable. Since I do not suspect interaction between the size of the water resource and 
membership in IROs I do not add an interaction term to this model. However, in 
Model 9 I add an interaction term between Basin size and Joint membership in an IRO. 
I did, however, also explore if there could be interaction between Basin size and IROs 
in the dyad (Model 8). This investigation showed hardly any interaction, since the 
estimates from the analysis with and without the interaction term were not 
significantly different from each other, and did not improve the explanatory power of 
the model. 
 
Major power is not significant in the replication of Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006) or 
in the analysis with dyads sharing a basin. This variable is also excluded from the 
analyses together with contiguity. The control variables will only be discussed here if 
the analysis yields results that require further explanation. 
 
Tolerance and VIF values showed no signs of collinearity, other than that mentioned in 
Section 5.2.1. The independent variable does not correlate highly with any of the 
control variables. Basin size has a correlation of 0.486 with Inter-capital distance. 
When eliminating Inter-capital distance from the model, Basin size becomes 
significant at the 1% level. Since Inter-capital distance is a very important control for 
investigating conflicts, and basin size probably is too, I have decided to keep them 
both. 
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The coefficient for the variable IRO in the dyad reports an exp(0.099), which means 
that the odds for MID onset in dyads where there is an IRO is 1.1 compared to dyads 
that do not have an IRO. This result is counterintuitive, and goes against my 
expectations, that IROs would reduce conflicts, not enhance them. But the result is not 
close to being significant with a p-value of 0.34. Model 7 has a better fit than Model 8, 
with a higher R
2
 and a higher Hosmer-Lemeshov value. It makes no sense comparing 
the two –2LL values, since Models 7 and 8 are not nested57. If they had been nested,  
–2LL could give us valuable information.58 The difference between the models is 
minimal. The results do not support Hypothesis 1, that a dyad where at least one state 
is member of an international river organization has less conflict than dyads where no 
states are members. 
5.2.3 MID onset in dyads where both countries are members of the same 
IRO 
Model 9 has Both countries member of same IRO as an independent variable. In this 
analysis, I will add an interaction term between my independent variable and Basin 
size. Even though Basin size was not significant in the previous model we might find 
that it will be in interaction with joint membership in the same IRO. If two countries 
share a large water basin they are probably more likely to be member of the same IRO 
to manage the resource. I first conducted the logistic regression analysis with an 
ordinary interaction term. The tolerance test discovered extreme values for some of the 
variables with a tolerance of 0.17 and VIF of 57. Interaction terms are particularly 
prone to multicollinearity problems. To try to reduce the multicollinearity between my 
main independent variable and the interaction term, I centered the variables by 
subtracting the mean. I then computed a new centered interaction term. A new test 
showed that the tolerance values for the problematic variables now ranged from 0.53 
to 0.99 and VIF between 1.00 and 1.90. Thus, the collinearity problem had been 
eliminated. The new lower estimate of 0.097, after the correction of the collinearity 
                                              
57 If all explanatory variables in one competing model is a perfect subset of variables included in a second model, then we 
may say that the first is “nested” within the second, and a likelihood ratio test is appropriate to assess the empirical adequacy 
of one model against another (Gujarati, 2003: 530). 
58 This is like a t-test in OLS regression. 
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problems, means that the odds for going to war are 1.1 (exp(0.097)) in dyads where 
both countries are members of an IRO compared to dyads where at least one country is 
not. The results do not supported liberal peace theory and neoliberal institutionalism 
that led me to believe that less conflict would follow cooperation between states. On 
the other hand, increased interaction also can be a catalyst for increased conflicts, 
especially between dyads experiencing water stress. However, none of the variables 
was significant. The Hosmer-Lemeshow value of 0.68 in Model 9 is lower than in 
Model 7, and the squared-r value is also unchanged. Hypothesis 3, that a dyad where 
both states are members of the same international river organization has less conflict 
than other dyads, is not supported. The variables that were included in the interaction 
term did not change when I removed the interaction term from the analysis, which 
mean that there is hardly any interaction between them. The interaction term will be 
excluded from further analyses.  
5.2.4 MID onset and membership in bilateral and multilateral IROs 
These analyses were designed to answer Hypotheses 5 and 7. For Models 10 and 11, I 
discuss only the results from the new variables in the analyses, since none of the 
control variables change very much. Since I did not find any significant results from 
the analyses of Models 8 and 9 regarding IRO membership, it was unlikely that I 
would get any significant result when using disaggregated data with even fewer 
observations. The variable measuring whether or not both countries are members of 
the same bilateral IRO is not significant (p-value of 0.22). The R
2 
is reduced with 0.05 
percent from 0.39 in Model 8 to 0.38 in Model 10, which means it explains less. Since 
the models are non-nested, a –2LL test is inappropriate. The Hosmer-Lemeshov test 
shows that the previous Model 8 has a better fit to the data since the values reported 
decrease from 0.68 to 0.34. Hypothesis 5, that dyads where both states are member of 
the same bilateral international river organization have less conflict than other dyads, 
is not supported. 
 
The effect of multilateral IROs MID onset, with a p-value of 0.42, is even further from 
being significant than bilateral IRO membership in the dyad. The Hosmer-Lemeshov 
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value (0.56) shows a better fit for Model 11 compared to Model 10, but is has a poorer 
fit than Model 9. Hypothesis 7, that dyads where both states are member of the same 
multilateral international river organization have less conflict than other dyads, is not 
supported. 
 
So far I have not succeeded in yielding any significant results for IRO membership on 
conflict. My next analyses will investigate membership in IROs in relation to water 
scarcity for dyads sharing water basins.  
5.3 IROs impact on MID onsets in dyads with water scarcity 
Out of 86 IROs worldwide, 48 were founded in 1975 or later. A large share of my 
observations is within this time period. We also know that water stress is a relatively 
new phenomenon and that it is closely connected to countries‟ development level, 
population size, and water availability. Since the available water scarcity data only 
cover the time period from 1975, this analysis is limited to the period from 1975 to 
2000. A water crisis or water scarcity of any kind is likely to set focus on the water 
issue and that probably increases the likelihood of both cooperation and conflict. 
According to the neomalthusians limited access to resources is critical for a region's 
stability. Water scarcity therefore might show to be significantly associated with 
conflict. The cornucopians on the other hand, emphasizes that there is enough water 
resources and that the process of distributing this will lead to cooperation. I believe 
water scarcity to motivate states to join IROs to secure satisfactory water supply. This 
is highly relevant e.g. for the Nile water basin where ten states share a common water 
resource, and several of them have often experienced water scarcity. The water is 
especially needed for irrigation, to feed a growing population and for hydro-power. 
The potential water stress will probably initiate or increase cooperation, but may also 
lead to MID onsets. Water issues are especially important for Egypt which is 
downstream from all the other states. Controlling water access by joining IROs and 
other formal agreements with other states is crucial for their survival. Based on this 
example I expect there to be interaction between IRO membership and drought. To 
investigate this I will include an interaction term in my model. I will not discuss the 
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result from the other control variables in the analyses unless they change significantly 
from the replication. A brief investigation of the drought and IRO membership 
variables in bivariate analyses shows that drought was significantly related to conflict 
at the 1% level, but that the odds for MID onset is 0.6 for dyads that have experienced 
drought compared to dyads that have not. This supports the cornucopian view that 
resource stress probably will enhance cooperation rather than stimulate conflict as 
argued by the neomalthusians. My IRO variables point in different directions. Table 
5.5 shows that the presence of an IRO in the dyad increases the likelihood of a MID 
onset. In dyads where both countries are member of the same IRO, the likelihood of 
MID onset is reduced. This is understandable considering that many of the IROs are 
bilateral whereas many international rivers are shared by more than two countries.  
 
 
Table 5.5 Bivariate analyses of MID onset 
Variables MID onset 
Water scarcity (drought) –0.558***(0.128) 
IRO in dyad 0.085 (0.137) 
Both member of same IRO –0.068 (0.133) 
(n) 5780 
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p<0.01. S.E. in parentheses 
 
In other words, two countries can reach an agreement beneficial for the two countries 
that is not necessarily beneficial for the other states in the shared water basin, and this 
may increase the tension in other dyads. A dyad where both states are members of the 
same IRO will therefore reduce conflict, and the opposite may be the case for dyads 
where only one country is member of an IRO. This scenario was discussed in Section 
3.2. The results from the IRO membership variables were not significant so I have 
come no further in finding support for my basic hypotheses. 
 
I conducted a multivariate logistic regression model with only the control variables 
from the replication first, except Contiguity and Major power since they were not 
significant in any of my previous analyses. After this I ran a full logistic regression 
analysis with Basin size, Drought, IRO in the dyad and an interaction term between 
IRO in the dyad and Drought. I compared the –2LL values from the two models and 
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the latter model was a significantly better model.
59
 I ran a full regression model with 
all the variables to check if anything changed, from the bivariate logistic regressions. 
The full models were conducted with all the control variables used, except the 
interaction term between Both countries member in the dyad and Basin size, which 
displayed hardly any interaction and was not significant. Basin size was not significant 
in Models 8 and 9, but I decided to keep it in the next model together with Drought. In 
addition I included an interaction term between the IRO membership variable and 
Drought. The interaction terms have been centered to reduce collinearity. A tolerance 
test reports no collinearity problems for any of the new variables entered in the models 
with acceptable VIF and tolerance values. Table 5.6 reports all the results from the 
analyses. In Model 12 the presence of an IRO in the dyad is still not significant (p = 
0.34), but it is in the interaction term with the water scarcity variable (p = 0.044). For 
IROs in dyads which also have experienced drought the odds for MID onset are 0.4 
compared to other dyads, everything else being equal. The presence of an IRO in a 
dyad gives odds of 1.2 (exp(0.165)) for MID onset compared to dyads without IROs. 
Water scarcity is significant at the 5% level. The odds for MID onset in dyads that 
have experienced drought are 0.7 compared to other dyads. Basin size is very close to 
being significant at the 5% level (p =0.056). The larger a water basin the less likely it 
is that there will be conflicts in the dyad, everything else being equal, with odds of 0.9 
(exp(–0.11). All other control variables reported results as expected, with Peace 
history and Inter-capital distance as the strongest predictors for conflict reduction in 
dyads. The regime type variables all increase the likelihood of MID onset compared to 
the reference category Two democracies 
 
                                              
59 These models are nested so a -2LL test is appropriate. -2LL (first model) – -2LL (last model) = 1,390-1,378 = 12. With 4 
df. (4 additional variables were added to the model) the critical value is 9.49. The full model with all the extra variables is 
probably a better model investigating MID onset. 
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From this analysis we found some support for Hypothesis 1, but only for dyads that 
have also experienced drought. For all other dyads IROs seem to have the opposite 
effect and the likelihood for conflict increases with the presence of an IRO. As 
mentioned earlier, this might be due to the fact that some IROs reach agreements 
affecting all dyads but which might benefit only a few dyads, and hurt others in the 
same shared basin. In situations with water scarcity, dyads are forced to cooperate. 
Reaching agreements regarding important water resources is therefore highly relevant. 
Based on this I decided to also conduct a new analysis with an interaction term 
 
Table 5.6 Results for logistic regression of MID onset 1975–2000, full 
model 
Independent variable/Model 12 13 
IRO in the dyad 0.167 
(0.176) 
 
Both countries member of IRO   0.371** 
(0.176) 
Gravity model   
Inter-capital distance (log) –0.605*** 
(0.125) 
–0.59*** 
(0.124) 
Population in the largest country 
(log) 
0.128 
(0.079) 
0.124 
(0.079) 
Population in the smallest country 
(log) 
0.431*** 
(0.089) 
0.435*** 
(0.089) 
GDP per capita in the largest 
economy (log) 
 –0.088 
(0.153) 
–0.022 
(0.151) 
GDP per capita in the smallest 
economy (log) 
–0.446*** 
(0.161) 
–0.515*** 
(0.163) 
Other control variables   
Peace history  –3.431*** 
(0.175) 
–3.301*** 
(0.176) 
One democracy 0.601** 
(0.293) 
0.687** 
(0.294) 
Two autocracies 0.646* 
(0.338) 
0.751** 
(0.340) 
Unconsolidated regimes 0.774*** 
(0.307) 
0.835*** 
(0.309) 
Size of shared basin –0.107* 
(0.056) 
–0.123** 
(0.057) 
Drought  –0.398** 
(0.178) 
–0.394** 
(0.175) 
Drought*independent –0.639** 
(0.318) 
–0.159 
(0.306) 
Constant –0.922 
(1.451) 
–0.924 
(1.458) 
Hosmer-Lemeshov p-value 0.40 0.89 
Pseudo-R2 (nag.k) 0.386 0.386 
-2LL 1,378 1,379.3 
(n) 5,780 5,780 
S.E. in parentheses 
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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between basin size and IRO membership. When adding this variable to the model, the 
interaction term between IRO membership and drought was no longer significant, but 
the new interaction term between basin size and IRO membership was significant at 
the 5% level (p = 0.014). The presence of IROs in large water basins that also have 
experienced drought seems to reduce conflict. 
 
In Model 13 the variable measuring if both states are members of the same IRO yields 
a surprising and significant result. The odds for MID onset in dyads where both 
countries are members of the same IRO are 1.4 compared to other dyads, everything 
else being equal. I have no explanation for this. I expected the presence of an IRO 
where both countries are members of the same IRO to reduce the conflict level in a 
dyad, not to increase it. Hypothesis 3 is not supported. In interaction with the drought 
variable the likelihood of MID onset in a dyad where both countries are member of the 
same IRO is lower than for other dyads. This is more in accordance with my 
theoretical assumptions but the result is not significant. Perhaps states that have not 
experienced water scarcity will fight for the water instead of reaching peaceful 
agreements? That fighting for the resource is not so threatening, since they never have 
experienced water stress? Fighting over water for other reasons than sustaining life is 
legitimated but when it is threatening life one cannot lose and this is a major motivator 
for cooperation? All other variables in Model 13 report results as expected and did not 
change much compared to Model 12. 
 
Models 14 and 15 investigate the relationship between membership in bilateral and 
multilateral organizations and conflict in dyads. These are disaggregated data from the 
Both countries member of the same IRO variable. The interaction term between the 
shared IRO membership variable and drought was not significant and is therefore 
excluded. Only the estimates for the new variables are reported in Table 5.6, since 
none of the other controls changed significantly. 
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Nothing in Models 14 or 15 supports my Hypotheses 5 and 7. From the analysis we do 
not know of any significant effect for dyads with multilateral or bilateral IRO 
memberships on MID onset in dyads. The Odds for MID onset are approximately 1.2 
for dyads with bilateral IRO membership. The odds for MID onset in dyads with 
multilateral IRO memberships are a little bit lower with odds of 1.1 compared to dyads 
without IRO membership. Since none of the estimates are significant my hypotheses 
are not supported. 
5.4 IROs impact on MID onsets in dyads between 1990–2000 
In this chapter I investigate the period after the Cold War. In these analyses I will not 
analyze bilateral and multilateral IROs unless I yield very strong results from the 
variable Both countries member of the same IRO. None of the earlier analyses has 
reported any significant differences between these IROs and the estimates have only 
reported minor differences between the two of them.  
 
Neomalthusians emphasize that resource and environmental issues are becoming more 
important conflict factors, since the end of the Cold War unlocked the world from a 
tightly bipolar confrontation between East and West (Toset et al., 2000: 981). 
Resource scarcity challenges shared water resources, and this question has become 
more serious because of population growth and increasing consumption. Water issues 
are more important factors regarding both cooperation and conflict. This increased 
focus on natural resources after the Cold War has probably provided an added 
 
Table 5.6 Results of logistic regression of MID onset 1975–2000, full 
model 
Independent variable /Model 14 15 
Member of same bilateral IRO  0.167 
(0.241)) 
 
Member of same Multilateral IRO   0.110 
(0.201) 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 0.973 0.878 
Pseudo-R2 (Nag.k) 0.38 0.379 
N 5437 5437 
S.E. in parentheses 
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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incentive for establishing IROs to meet the challenge of water stress and shared water 
basins. 31 of 86 IROs were founded after the Cold War (Dombrowsky, Table A-1: 
330–360) In Table 5.7, I only report the results from the IRO variables, and the 
interaction terms between my IRO variables and Drought and between my IRO 
variables and Basin size. 
 
All the other controls show the same tendencies, but the regime type variable Two 
autocracies is no longer significant. Peace history and Inter-capital distance are the 
strongest and most significant predictors for conflict. In Model 16 dyads where at least 
one state is member of an IRO is significantly related to conflict with a p = 0.023. The 
odds for MID onset are 1.8 compared to all other dyads, everything else being equal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This change in interaction with the Drought variable. The odds of 0.49 means that the 
likelihood for MID onset in dyads that also have experienced drought is reduced 
compared to all other dyads. This result was not significant (p = 0.13). The same 
applies to the interaction term between Shared basin and IRO in the dyad. The 
likelihood of MID onset is reduced when the size of a water basin increases. In Model 
17 all the control variables again show the same tendencies and all regime type 
variables are significant. Neither Drought nor Basin size is significant in this model. 
The odds for MID onset increase slightly in dyads with joint IRO membership with 
odds of 1.1 (exp(0.086)), but the result is not significant. The interaction term with 
 
Table 5.7 Results logistic regression of MID onset 
1990–2000, full model 
Independent variable/ Model 16 17 
IRO in the dyad 0.611** 
(0.269) 
 
Both countries member of same IRO  0.092 
(0.254) 
IRO and Drought –0.721 
(0,071) 
0.299 
(0.426) 
IRO and Basin size –0.071 
(0.130) 
0.323 
(0.168) 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 0.228 0.877 
Pseudo-R2 (Nag.k) 0.313 0.305 
N 3202 3202 
S.E. in parentheses 
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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basin size is close to significant (p = 0.055). The likelihood for MID onsets increases 
with larger water basins, everything else being equal. 
 
The Hosmer-Lemeshov value has a much lower value compared to all the other 
previous models, which means that the model is less suitable for the data. From the 
previous models the R
2 
is reduced. Model 17 has a better fit to data with a higher 
Hosmer-Lemeshow value, but the model explains even less of the variance in the 
dependent variable. 
 
Based on the analysis, none of my hypotheses are supported. Where I yielded 
significant results, the likelihood of MID onset increased and was not reduced as I 
expected from Hypothesis 1. I have argued earlier that this may be due to some IROs 
reaching agreements with negative externalities. The joint membership variable was 
not significant at all, not even in the interaction terms. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not 
supported. It is hard to explain why. By theoretical assumptions it is hard to argue that 
cooperation through IROs leads to increased conflicts. One possible explanation might 
be that most of the IROs are established between dyads where there is tension and 
need for cooperation to lessen the tension. However, I do not have data to test this 
possible explanation. 
5.5 IROs impact on MID onsets in specific regions 
Following leads in some of the earlier research, I decided to test if some regions with 
high water stress, such as Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) or the Middle East/North Africa 
(MENA) exhibited different patterns regarding IRO membership and conflict. 27 IROs 
are established in these two regions. 17 IROs of them were founded in the late eighties 
and until 2002. The region variables are originally from Gleditsch et al. (2006). The 
next analysis covers the time span from 1975 to 2000 for dyads also sharing a water 
basin. This reduces the observations in Model 18 to 2,477 dyad-years in SSA, and in 
Model 19 to 845 dyad-years in MENA. In this period 71 MID onsets with at least one 
casualty have been observed in SSA and 75 in MENA. The region variables are both 
expected to have a negative effect on conflict when used in an interaction term with 
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the variable Both countries in the dyad member of the same IRO. This follows from 
the theoretical perspective that the underlying threats of water stress can lead to 
cooperation as well as confrontation. Cooperation through IROs might reduce conflict 
in these regions. The countries are often poor, with limited means to cooperate. In 
addition they often have unstable regimes, which may also stimulate conflict and 
inhibit cooperation 
 
The results from these analyses were not encouraging. Not even the control variables 
were significant, except Peace history. This variable has been the strongest predictor 
for reduced conflict throughout all my analyses. My IRO variables were not significant 
either alone in bivariate analyses or in the full model. The results will therefore not be 
reported.  
5.6 A short summary of the analyses 
To answer my four hypothesis regarding IRO membership and MID onset, I started 
with a replication of Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006). Their analysis provided support 
for the importance of shared basins for conflict and cooperation. In addition Gleditsch 
et al. (2006) found that the size of a shared basin was significantly related to conflict. 
Based on these results I wanted to investigate whether international river organization 
could add to our understanding of conflict and cooperation in dyads sharing a water 
basin. However, a long road through multiple analyses yielded very little. Because of a 
major problem with the replication of the analysis regarding cooperation, that part of 
my research question could not be pursued empirically. When analyzing the effect of 
IROs on conflict there was only little support for my hypotheses. The significant effect 
of IRO memberships in dyads also sharing water basin in the period between 1975 and 
2000 contradicts my hypothesis. A similar significant result was found for the period 
between 1990 and 2000. In the same time period (1975–2000), the presence of an IRO 
that includes both countries in the dyad was significantly related to reduced conflict if 
the dyad had also recently experienced drought. This was the closest I got to finding 
support for a part of my research question.  
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6.0 Objectives 
The validity of all research will always be dependent on the researcher‟s ability to 
consider the right factors. Militarized disputes arise for a variety of reasons. If we find 
a correlation between membership in IROs and cooperation, we cannot be certain 
whether the membership caused cooperation directly or whether it simply had an 
indirect effect, or if the effect was spurious. The same applies for the correlation 
between membership in international river organizations and conflict. The research on 
this subject has to develop further and only a few analyses are never enough to build 
any durable theory. All results therefore have to be interpreted with circumspection. 
How much does the theoretical assumption and predictions match with the empirical 
findings? Have we asked the right questions and picked the most relevant variables? 
Are the operationalizations of the variables good enough or are they questionable? 
How good is the quality of the data? And finally, is the model fit for the data, so the 
interpretations of the results give any substantial meaning? The analysis of TSCS (time 
series cross sectional) data is very challenging. Often researchers are not skilled 
enough to build proper models to fit the data. The more variables in a model, the easier 
it is to build castles in the air. It can be hard to know if we analyze real causal relations 
or only random noise. The traps are many, and often the researcher prestige is at stake. 
Is it possible that the eagerness to reach significant result for a theory one believes in, 
sometimes can make researchers close the eyes for obstacles they should have taken 
more seriously? Are all the conditions fulfilled for the different statistical methods so 
that we assume that the results are trustworthy? This is probably the case for the 
logistic regression in this thesis, since e.g. the time dependence is not given much 
consideration. Logistic regression is a useful method since it has fewer requirements. 
However this does not mean that logistic regression models are not also influenced by 
e.g. autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. During my work with this thesis I 
experienced that the conditions for different statistical methods often are not met, e.g. 
normal distributions, heteroskedasticity, uncorrelated errors among the independent 
variables etc.. It is extremely difficult to build good models for complex research 
questions. It seems to be a common challenge in social sciences which really set high 
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demands on the researcher. On the other hand the aim to reach generalized conclusions 
can easily drown in all the objections both to design, methods and data used 
(Dombrowsky, 2007: 120). That is not the purpose. One has to be able to say 
something about a complex world, but figures from different analyses have to be 
interpreted with prudence. 
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7.0 Concluding remarks 
In this thesis my focus has been on water and how water might influence both 
possibilities for conflict, but also cooperation, by looking at the role played by IROs. 
Scholars have long been interested in understanding the relationship between 
resources, conflict, and cooperation. A lot of attention has been given to the role of 
water as a causal factor in conflicts between countries, but scholars still disagree about 
the importance of water in such conflicts. In general, major obstacles towards 
cooperation and also incentives for conflicts are due to absence of an authority in an 
anarchic world system. The lack of definite property rights, information uncertainties, 
asymmetries, and lack of an external and plausible enforcement authority influence the 
outcome and limit effective cooperation. Some of these obstacles, however, can be 
remedied by functional institutions (Dombrowsky, 2007).  
 
The gravity model has proven to be a very robust and useful model for examining 
international relations. Measures of size and distance have proven to have an important 
impact on states‟ interaction, and variables operationalizing these measures should 
always be present in such models. Other commonly used control variables when 
investigating conflict and cooperation were almost all, without exception, robust 
predictors for conflict and cooperation. The gravity model and the other control 
variables used in my analyses have proven to be long lived and hard to falsify. With 
this robust model I did not succeed in getting much support for IROs importance to 
dyads sharing a common water resource. The results from my analyses of IRO‟s 
influence provide partial support for only one of my eight hypotheses.  
 
My main goal with this thesis, to explore the role of IROs in the interaction of states, 
was somewhat ambiguous. But with the increased focus on water resources and 
establishment of IROs to meet the challenges of water scarcity, it is necessary to start 
investigating whether these organizations can make a significant difference in conflict 
reduction and cooperation enhancement. In social sciences the main goal is never only 
to get significant result, but when significant effects are found, it provides a foundation 
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for development of new tools for further investigations. To even be able to come forth 
with political recommendation one really has to base one‟s research on durable 
theories and robust meaningful analyses. Sometimes theory is in a position to predict 
outcomes and point to ways for improvements. The research can identify gaps and 
point to areas where further research is needed. Other times theory does not hold water 
when it faces empirical evidence.  
 
In Section 3.2 above I described a scenario where only a few countries might reach an 
agreement at the expense of other states in a shared water basin. Most IROs are 
bilateral and many rivers are shared by more than two states. So it is likely that 
disputes might even increase regarding water resources with the presence of an IRO. 
Further research might be undertaken to investigate whether there is less conflict and 
more cooperation between dyads where all states riparian to a river are members of a 
joint IRO compared to dyads where not all states riparian to the shared water are 
represented. Another aspect which would be interesting for further elaboration is 
upstream/downstream scenarios, especially in relation to the geographical location of a 
more powerful state in the international river basin.  
 
Many IROs have a narrow and sectoral focus, but in these analyses presented here they 
are all analyzed together. To gain more knowledge about international river 
organizations‟ effectiveness it is necessary to be more specific and improve the data 
being used. There is need for more knowledge about each IRO to assess the 
effectiveness, and to trace the causal relationships between institutional design and 
states‟ interaction. One suggestion is to disaggregate the IRO data even further, and 
distinguish between different issue areas upon which the different IROs are focused. 
For instance, some IROs may be very specific, working either with water quality or 
quantity. Others work only with regulations concerning fisheries and navigation. 
Analyzing them, while disregarding these differences, might therefore be a weakness 
in the research design. But with the time frame of this thesis, disaggregating the IRO 
data further than down to bilateral and multilateral IROs was not possible.  
 
91 
 
The results in many of the analyses contradict my hypotheses by predicting increased 
conflicts with the presence of IROs. There might be coherence between establishment 
of IROs and the history of conflict in specific regions. More IROs might have been 
established in regions where the conflict level is high and the need for cooperation is 
pressing. In this perspective my results from the analyses is understandable, but IROs 
cannot be interpreted as a cause of the conflict. We need more research to elucidate 
this.  
 
The only significant result supporting one of my hypotheses was in dyads that also 
recently had experienced water scarcity. This gives an incentive to establish IROs in 
certain regions vulnerable to drought. States can be rewarded with reduced conflict 
levels and more peaceful cooperation by establishing a well functioning IRO. In other 
regions, nothing in my analyses support a conflict reducing effect of IROs. 
 
Conflicts have complex causes and it can be very complicated to distinguish between 
them. Water is often mentioned as a conflict trigger but hardly any conflicts between 
states are solely explained by water disagreements. Water interests are often more 
hidden, like e.g. in the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan, and most likely 
water is a very important cause of China‟s occupation of Tibet too. In Section 1.3, I 
cited Gleick‟s (2008) categorization of different ways in which water is related to 
conflict. The MID data could be recoded to be better suited to explore water‟s 
importance in states‟ interactions using these categories. Improvement of the data will 
probably improve the precision and focus on target questions. These important 
questions should be addressed in more detail in further studies. 
 
Since I could hardly find any significant results to support my hypothesis regarding the 
importance of IROs in interactions between states, would it be expedient to further 
institutionalize cooperation over international waters? To this I would nevertheless say 
yes. The IWRM concept (International Water Resource Management) might be too all-
embracing and complicated, but it does not mean the subject matter is not important. 
The literature on international river management suggests that IROs can play an 
92 
 
important role in bringing about cooperation. However, knowledge about how such 
institutions is most effective remains limited (Dombrowsky 2007). Ideally a well-
functioning institution can help states to share the benefit and costs of shared rivers 
peacefully, and maybe even more efficiently. To further investigate IROs I would say 
we need both statistical analyses and in-depth studies to complement each other to 
develop this research further. Especially important will be comparative studies to find 
out what institutional features are most successful and what is less so. Building 
institutions take decades, and each IRO has to adapt to specific circumstances and 
challenges. There will never be a “one design fits all” for IROs. 
  
Both neomalthusians and cornucopians will probably find some support for their 
future scenarios. Water is a fundamental resource but also renewable which naturally 
is likely to booster both friendly and hostile interactions between states sharing 
international waters. 
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Appendix 1: Codebook for the IRO variables 
 
The sources of the following variables are from Dombrowsky (2007: Table A-1, 330–
360). 
 
Variables 
 
International river organizations 
 All the IROs in Table A-1 are coded by number 301 to 399 and 101 to 103. Each 
organization has its own number. Where a country is member of more than one 
organization it is given a composite number.For instance, if a country is member of 
organization 301 and 302 it is given the number 301302. Where a country is member 
of more than four river organizations they are given one “three digit” joint number. 
E.g. France is member of five IROs in the Rhine river basin. Instead of a fifteen digit 
long number (378379380381382383), France is given 385. 
 
The first two variables coded in the dataset show if state a or state b in a dyad (a-b) 
have membership in an international river organization, and which specific IRO it is.  
 
For instance, if Syria is only member of the Joint Syro-Jordanian Commission, and 
Jordan is member of the same IRO and in addition a member of the Joint Water 
Committee, they are given the codes 336 and 336337. By the numbers we can go to 
Table A-1 and see which specific IRO they belong to. The coding was done this way 
in order to make it possible to further disaggregate the data into, for instance, the main 
issue areas of the IROs. From these codes we also know if the IRO is bilateral or 
multilateral if the same numbers appears for several dyads, or only once.  
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Year both countries became members of the same International River 
Organization 
 
This variable is coded with the year both countries in a dyad became members of the 
same international river organization. It is later recoded into a dichotomous variable 
and given 1 if it is an IRO both countries are member of in the dyad, and 0 otherwise.  
 
From this variable I coded two variables stating whether both countries in a dyad are 
members of the same multilateral or bilateral IRO. I did this by looking in Table A-1 
for every IRO and found out how many states were member of the IRO, and by 
looking at the IRO numbers. 
 
First organization founded in the dyad  
The first international river organization founded is coded with the foundation year. 
Sometimes states are members of more than one international river organization. In 
those cases, the earliest foundation year is chosen. This variable is recoded into a 
dichotomous variable with the value 1 if there is an IRO in the dyad and 0 otherwise. 
 
Other information regarding the coding 
Dyads with the two German states, DDR and GFR: Dombrowsky (2007) does not 
provide information regarding DDR and GFR. Some information is missing about 
membership since Dombrowsky (2007) only uses Germany in her Table A-1, even 
several IROS were established during the Cold War when Germany was divided. I 
have e.g. coded the organization that was founded in 1974 (German-Czech 
Commission on Boundary Water) both for DDR and GFR for dyads from 1974 to 
1989. For other information missing for DDR and GFR I have used a map to check 
where the river runs through Germany. If the river runs through both states, both dyads 
with GFR and DDR are coded, and only for DDR or GFR if the river runs through 
either one of them. 
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Table A-1  International River Basin Organizations (from Dombrowsky, 2007) 
Int’l River 
Basin after 
TFDD*  
IRO 
Nr. 
Area  Treaty 
Basins 
Ba-
sin 
Sta-
tes 
Organization Foun-
dation 
Member States Issue Areas 
 No. 000 
km²  
 No.  Year  No.  No. 
Amazon 301 5.866,1  Amazon 8 Amazonian Cooperation Council 1978 Bolivia, 
Brazil, 
Colombia, 
Ecuador, 
Guyana, Peru, 
Surinam, 
Venezuela 
8 Ecology, 
Economic 
Development, 
Water Quality 
3 
Amur 302 2.085,9  Bulgan, 
Halah, Bor 
Nor, Lake, 
Kerulen/ 
Herlen He 
 Joint Committee on 
Transboundary Waters 
1994 China, 
Mongolia 
2 Ecology, 
Fishing, Flood 
Control, 
Infrastructure, 
Water Quality, 
Water Quantity 
6 
Aral Sea 303 1.231,4  Aral Sea, 
Amu 
Darya, Syr 
Darya 
8 Interstate Council for the Aral 
Sea Basin Crisis with Standing 
Tashkent-based Executive 
Committee, Coordinating 
Commission on Water 
Resources, Commission of 
Social and Economic 
Development and Cooperation in 
Scientific, Technical, and 
Ecological Spheres 
1993 Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan; 
Russia as 
observer 
5 Water Quality, 
(Water 
Quantity) 
1+ 
Asi/Orontes 304 37,9  Al Asi, 
Orontes 
3 Joint Technical Committee 1994 Lebanon, 
Syria 
2 Infrastructure, 
Water Quality  
 
2 
Nile 365  Nile 10 Nile Basin Initiative 1999 Burundi, DR 
Congo, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Rwan-
da, Sudan, 
Tanzania, 
Uganda; 
Eritrea as 
observer 
9 Ecology, Econ. 
Development, 
Erosion 
Control, Flood 
Control, 
Hydropower, 
Infrastructure, 
Irrigation, 
River 
Regulation 
10+ 
Rhine 378 172,9 Rhine 9 Central Commission for the 
Navigation on the Rhine  
1815/ 
1868 
Belgium, 
France, 
Germany, the 
Netherlands, 
Switzerland 
5 Navigation 1+ 
Senegal 394 436,0 Senegal 4 Organization for the 
Management of the Senegal 
River 
1972/ 
1978/ 
1982 
Mali, 
Mauritania, 
Senegal, 
Guinea as 
observer 
3 Ecology, 
Economic 
Development, 
Hydropower, 
Irrigation, 
Navigation,  
River 
Regulation, 
Water Quality, 
Water Quantity 
8 
Table A-1 is originally 22 pages long. Listed here are the first IROs (and the IROs mentioned in thesis) in the 
table in order to show how the variables were coded. 
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Appendix 2: Additional results from the analyses 
 
Correlation matrix for the independent variables for dyads sharing a river basin for the 
period 1950–2000 ( n=11,111). 
C
orrelations
1
-,075**
,076**
-,065**
,006
,115**
,076**
-,093**
-,068**
-,026**
,053**
,069**
-,018
-,025**
-,025**
-,033**
,076**
-,008
,000
,000
,000
,536
,000
,000
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-,002
-,019
,010
-,020*
-,012
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,639
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C
orrelation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*. 
 
This correlation matrix is meant as an example. I ran correlation tests for all my 
analyses. In addition I ran VIF and tolerance tests. 
 
104 
 
Tolerance test analyses for Model 7 (Section 5.2.1): 
Coefficientsa
,037 ,038 ,987 ,324
-,268 ,006 -,395 -44,815 ,000 ,934 1,071
,015 ,007 ,032 2,364 ,018 ,406 2,461
,020 ,008 ,041 2,602 ,009 ,295 3,393
,025 ,007 ,053 3,540 ,000 ,322 3,110
-,026 ,007 -,042 -3,580 ,000 ,522 1,917
-,034 ,003 -,137 -11,372 ,000 ,497 2,013
,012 ,002 ,068 6,643 ,000 ,692 1,446
,014 ,002 ,097 6,970 ,000 ,375 2,668
,009 ,004 ,040 2,233 ,026 ,223 4,487
-,020 ,004 -,088 -4,519 ,000 ,192 5,203
-4,6E-005 ,001 ,000 -,036 ,971 ,681 1,468
-,006 ,006 -,010 -1,077 ,281 ,855 1,170
(Constant)
peacehis  peacehis tory
onedemoc
twoautoc
unconsol  unconsolidated
majorpow  majorpower
lndistan  lndistance
lnsmlpop
lnlrgpop
lnlrggdpcap  Log large
gdp per capita
lnsmlgdpcap  Log small
gdp per capita
lntotalb  lntotalbasin
contigui  contiguity
Model
1
B Std.  Error
Unstandardized
Coeff icients
Beta
Standardized
Coeff icients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity  Stat istics
Dependent Variable: fmidonse  fmidonseta.  
 
Correlation matrix; independent variables shared basin and Contiguity: 
Correlations
1 ,822**
,000
84517 84517
,822** 1
,000
84517 84517
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
sharedba  sharedbasin
contigui  contiguity
sharedba 
sharedbasin
contigui 
contiguity
Correlat ion is  signif icant at the 0.01 lev el (2-tailed).**. 
 
 
Correlation matrix; independent Inter-capital distance and Contiguity: 
Correlations
1 -,281**
,000
11111 11111
-,281** 1
,000
11111 11111
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
lndistan  lndistance
contigui  contiguity
lndistan 
lndistance
contigui 
contiguity
Correlat ion is  signif icant at the 0.01 lev el (2-tailed).**. 
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Frequencies of dependent variables: 
 
Conflict, MID onset, all dyads 1950–2000: 
 
Conflict, MID onset, all dyads 1950–2000, with Shared basin: 
 
 
Cooperation, Dyadic trade, all dyads 1950–2000: 
 
Statistics
dy trd
83406
2077
1,1170
-,0854
,593
,008
-,677
,017
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Skewness
Std.  Error of  Skewness
Kurtosis
Std.  Error of  Kurtos is
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Cooperation, IGO membership, all dyads 1950–2000: 
 
Statistics
logigos
82242
3241
3,1450
3,2189
-1,332
,009
3,827
,017
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Skewness
Std.  Error of  Skewness
Kurtosis
Std.  Error of  Kurtos is
 
 
Normal distribution of the residuals variable. All independent variables in OLS 
regression with Dyadic trade as dependent variable (1950–2000): 
 
 
Normal distribution of the residuals variable. All independent variables in OLS 
regression with IGO membership as dependent variable (1950–2000): 
 
